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This paper deals with the so-called 'paradox of weakness' in the context of the 
EU institutions'. The aim is to explain how Luxembourg, the smallest EU 
member state, has been able to steer certain decisions, which it has attached 
considerable importance to, in accordance with its preferences. This particular 
study focuses on the issue of the location of the European institutions from 
1952 to the present in order to identify the factors which provide Luxembourg 
with the opportunity to guarantee the location of certain institutions in the 
Grand Duchy.
In Part 1 a number of hypothetical explanations of the means of influence of a 
small state in the European Union are suggested, and the theoretical framework, 
that of actor-centred institutionalism, which serves to highlight the explanatory 
factors, is set out.
Part 2 traces the development of the seat issue from 1952 to the present. The 
emphasis is placed on the occasions relevant to Luxembourg when the location 
of certain institutions was decided and when the siting came under attack. Each 
episode is systematically assessed with regard to the hypotheses of small state 
influence in the EU.
Part 3 draws theoretical conclusions from the study. First, it assesses the 
hypothetical framework with regard to the case study on Luxembourg and the 
seat of the institutions and seeks to identify those hypotheses which best 
explain the outcomes of this issue whilst explaining the limited applicability of 
the remaining hypotheses to this particular case. Finally, the study is assessed 
from the theoretical perspective with the intention of establishing the insights 
that can be gained from an actor-centred institutionalist approach.
1. Hypothesis and theoretical framework
Hypothesis
The hypothesis is put forward that Luxembourg is able to yield a 
disproportionate amount of influence with respect to its small size (as 
determined by population, territory and GNP). The assumption is made that 
within the institutional framework of the EU a small state is not necessarily in a
The term EU will be applied throughout this study to refer to the ECSC (European Coal and 
Steel Community), the EEC (European Economic Community), the EC (European 
Community), and the EU (European Union), unless specific reference is made to either the 



























































































weak position, and that small size can even be an advantage and provide an 
actor with opportunities. The aim is to identify the means of influence of 
Luxembourg in the European Union.
It must be specified at this point what exactly is meant by the notion of 
'influence' in this study. In the literature dealing with concepts of 'influence' 
and 'power' different views persist as to a universally valid definition applicable 
to these terms. However, the aim here is not to assess Luxembourg's influence 
in some abstract and universally valid form. The objective is rather to identify 
whether and how Luxembourg is able to have the desired effect on outcomes in 
issues it has an interest in. This interpretation of the notion of 'influence' 
concords with Bertrand Russell's definition of 'power' as 'the production of 
intended effects' (Russell 1986:19). It also follows suit to the discussion on the 
notion of 'influence' and 'power' of such authors as Mokken, Stokman and 
Baldwin who stress that these concepts need to be seen in a contextual, 
relational framework and analyzed with regard to a specific domain or issue 
(Mokken & Stokman 1976; Baldwin 1989).
A number of hypothetical reasons for the means of influence of Luxembourg in 
the EU are set out below.
(i) The principle of the equality of states, quasi-federalist notions of 
decision-making and the acquis communautaire
At the basis of a small state's influence in the EU lies the legal framework of 
the European Union, in particular the basic principles upon which the 
institutions were built, i.e. the international law principle of the equality of 
states and quasi-federalist notions of decision-making as well as the body of 
Community law, the so-called 'acquis communautaire'.
Irrespective of their size, all states are represented in the decision-making 
bodies. The essence of federal-type decision-making systems which take into 
account, on the one hand, the size of states as determined by population and 
territory, and, on the other, the principle of equality of all states, can be 
discerned in the EU decision-making system. Federalist systems pay special 
attention to minorities with the deliberate intention of preserving diversity. The 
EU has incorporated this principle since its very beginning by reserving a place 
for the representatives of small state members in the decision-making bodies.
The term 'federalist' is used here in the sense of a decentralized system of governance where 
the authority lies at the centre for some matters and at the regional level for other areas. The 





























































































Within the institutions of the European Community and Union, the Council, the 
Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), smaller member states are to a certain extent over-represented.
As European integration has progressed a body of Community law has 
developed. This acquis communautaire consists of Community legislation, 
Treaty provisions as well as agreements and decisions reached by the member 
states. The latter are bound by this legal framework, the respect of which is 
guaranteed by the ECJ. The body of Community law is irreversible, and thus 
provides the small states with a guarantee that any gains made therein are 
firmly established. As a result of these additional legal resources a small state 
increases its means of influence.
The acquis communautaire provides the small state with important means of 
influence since it gives it a legal guarantee to fall back on in negotiations. As it 
is generally easier to preserve the status quo than it is to bring about change, 
especially when the status quo has a strong legal back-up, the small state will 
consistently resort to a strategy of maintaining the acquis, of preserving the 
framework which provides it with a guaranteed position.
The logic o f institutional persistence further plays into the hands of the small 
state. Once institutions have been put in place, they determine the further 
development of the institutional environment. As Krasner points out, 'historical 
developments are path dependent: once certain choices are made they 
constrain future possibilities' (Krasner 1988:67). Hence, once the small state 
has been guaranteed a favourable position in the institutional set-up, its position 
is unlikely to be undermined thereafter. On the contrary, the position it enjoys 
in the initial institutional structure will determine its position in the further 
institutional set-up, in accordance with the theory of path-dependency.
The means of influence the small state derives from the basic EU principles and 
from the acquis communautaire is not merely of a passive nature as suggested 
by the logic of institutional persistence. The actor, i.e. the small state, has a 
direct input itself by actively taking advantage of institutional entrenchment, by 
playing on path-dependency. The actor can anticipate path-dependency and 
behave accordingly by consolidating its gains.
(ii) Special resources in one sector
The hypothesis is put forward that although a state may be deficient in overall 
quantitative resources, special resources in one particular sector may provide it 




























































































institutional context which covers numerous policy areas. Influence in one area 
may have implications for other areas. According to the theory of path- 
dependency once behaviour has been institutionalized in one area it creates a 
precedence and has implications for other areas. The same framework will be 
applied in other sectors although the conditions might differ. Hence, on the 
basis of an influential position in one area, a generally weak state may gain 
influence in other areas irrespective of the fact that its resources in this sector 
may be limited.
A small state can take advantage of institutional persistence. Once it has 
obtained certain rights in one area of decision-making, these rights become 
entrenched. They provide the actor with a certain status and position. This 
enhances the actor's resources, which can be instrumental in the defense of 
interests in other areas.
(lit) Behavioural implications of an actor's limited resources
The limited resources of an actor have implications for the way the actor 
behaves and for the way other actors behave towards them. Such behavioural 
situations may provide a small state actor with important opportunities of 
action. Three such behavioural implications of limited resources which may 
explain how a small state can exert influence in the European Union have been 
identified here.
First of all, given the limited resources of Luxembourg larger states do not 
perceive it as a threat. The relationship with the small state tends to be non­
competitive. Larger states tend to be more tolerant, understanding and even 
supportive towards the behaviour and the interests of a smaller partner. As a 
result, Luxembourg may be able to behave in a self-interested way without 
provoking opposition on the part of its larger and potentially more influential 
partner. The advantages a small state reaps may be substantial from its point of 
view, yet negligible from the point of view of a larger state. The tton- 
competitive relationship between two states with wide disparities in resources 
can influence outcomes considerably.
The second behavioural implication of small size suggests that the limited 
resources of a small state directly affect its own behaviour in the international 
decision-making process. Well aware of its lack of necessary resources to bring 
pressure to bear on other states and to play a leading role in the international 
arena, the small state adopts a low-profile approach and strategically avoids 
attracting the attention of its larger partners onto itself. In negotiations the small 




























































































amongst themselves. In most issues the state can afford to do so since, as a 
result of its limited resources, it does not have such strong vested interests to 
defend. Only when matters of primary importance to itself occur on the agenda 
will the small state actor intervene and plead for the observation of its vital 
interests. In such cases the small state can readily argue that its very existence is 
at stake, which renders concessions on the part of its larger partners all the 
more likely.
Given the limited resources of the small state, and hence the limited areas of 
vital interests, the occasions at which the actor has to intervene tend to be rare. 
As a result, the larger partners are less likely to be apprehensive towards the 
concerns of the smaller partner and tend to pay due regard to them. Hence, the 
argument that the small state is able to defend its interests through the low- 
profile approach it adopts is substantiated by the fact that it finds itself in a non­
competitive relationship with its larger partners. The second behavioural 
implication of small size is reinforced by the first.
The third behavioural implication of limited resources refers to the role of 
neutral coordinator which a small state is likely to take on as a result of a lack 
of strong vested interests, which in turn results from a lack of resources. The 
role of neutral coordinator provides it with considerable opportunities of action. 
Enjoying a central position in the interaction process, at the source of 
information, the small state is able to assess the situation objectively and steer 
the process in a way that the outcome will be favourable to itself, or at least will 
not harm its interests.
Once again, the fact that the small state finds itself in a non-competitive 
relationship with other states may make it all the more likely for the small state 
to take on the role of neutral coordinator. Given that the larger partner tend not 
to perceive a threat on the part of the small state, it finds itself in the ideal 
position to act as an honest broker. Hence, the first behavioural implication of 
small size substantiates the third.
(iv) Small public administration
As a small state Luxembourg has a relatively small public administration 
characterized by informal contacts and short lines of communications among 
departments and between ministers and their respective departments. This has 
two significant implications for the decision-making environment, which 




























































































First, such a close-knit environment is conducive to a strong common identity 
which promotes internal cohesion and solidarity. Aware of the external 
dependence and vulnerability of the small state, domestic actors cooperate 
closely, reach compromises and are likely to agree on a common interest when 
dealing with European issues (cf. Vogel 1983). Although this may not directly 
strengthen the small state's means of influence in the EU decision-making 
process, it may affect the small state’s ability of dealing with dependence and 
hence of holding its ground in the EU.
Secondly, close contacts and fluid exchange of information between the 
government and Luxembourg's permanent representatives in Brussels promotes 
swift and flexible response to decision-making processes at EU level. The 
considerable autonomy the Luxembourg permanent representatives to the EU 
enjoy means that they are not hampered by hierarchical and cumbersome 
administrative procedures but are able to assess situations on the basis of their 
personal knowledge and experience in a rational, swift and efficient manner. 
Rapid assessment of situations and swift adaptation gives the small state an 
advance on its partners when manoeuvring circumstances to its own advantage.
(v) Bilateral and multilateral relations
The final hypothetical explanation of a small state's means of defending its 
interests in the European Union is related to the practice of coalition-building 
among member states in the EU. In an attempt to defend its interests 
Luxembourg fosters its relations with other member states, and in particular 
with those it is historically and culturally linked to. The small state actively 
seeks and promotes cooperation with its neighbouring states, aims at a 
concertation of views and tries to form coalitions.
The Benelux Union provides an institutional cooperation framework for 
Luxembourg to concert with Belgium and the Netherlands. By forming a 
common front as the Benelux states, Luxembourg, Belgium and the 
Netherlands carry greater weight in the EU than they would each separately. 
However, given that the views of its Benelux partners do not always coincide, 
Luxembourg also endeavours to maintain good relationships with Germany and 
France, the other two states it is historically and culturally related with. The 
support it gains from coalitions with other member states may be essential to 
Luxembourg when it seeks to defend its vital interests.
Nurturing bilateral and multilateral relations is not an approach peculiar to 




























































































an attempt to explain how a small state can influence policy outcomes in its 
favour.
Coalition-formation and bargaining are the predominant means of reaching 
decisions in an environment where conflicts cannot be solved authoritatively. In 
the case of the EU the the decision-making process may differ considerably 
depending upon the policy area or the issue in question. However, regardless 
whether decisions are taken by unanimity or by qualified majority voting 
diverse interests must be accommodated. The durability of the EU and the 
scope of areas it covers are features particular to this institutional environment 
which enable package-solutions with multiple pay-offs (Wallace 1985: Wallace 
1990).
Theoretical approach
The purpose of theory is to provide a frame or lens through w'hich complex 
empirical phenomena can be ordered and understood. Theory is meant to 
simplify reality by highlighting certain aspects which have considerable 
explanatory force. The frame must be suited to the particular phenomena being 
analyzed. Since the aim here is to understand and to explain the behaviour of an 
actor and the outcomes of interaction, it makes sense to resort to different 
theories which emphasize the different aspects of the complex connection of 
phenomena. Depending upon the circumstances and the situation, one 
theoretical approach may have greater explanatory force than another. A 
complete understanding of Luxembourg's position in the EU necessitates a 
focus on different aspects of reality highlighted by different theories. A 
combination of theoretical approaches is most likely to provide adequate 
guidance in the exploration of the hypotheses.
An understanding of Luxembourg's influence in the EU necessitates a 
theoretical dimension which differentiates between the actor and the 
institutional environment. The theoretical approach adopted needs to clarify 
whether the means of influence of a specific small state in the European Union 
are institutionally related -  i.e. a consequence of the institutional structure of 
the EU which determines behaviour, preferences and capabilities -  or whether 
they are actor-specific -  i.e. dependent on the particular characteristics, 
behaviour and strategies of the state in question. This distinction will help to 
determine at a later point whether the hypotheses explaining why a small state 
can be influential in the EU can be applied to other small states in the EU or 




























































































This study resorts to 'actor-centred institutionalism’, a combination of 
institutionalism and rational choice theory, in an attempt to explain the means 
of influence of Luxembourg in EU decision-making. Although in their purest 
form these theories are often presented as being mutually exclusive in many of 
their claims, they can both individually explain a slice of reality. When these 
theoretical explanations are combined they can offer a complete picture of the 
complex phenomena to be explained.
Mayntz and Scharpf combine institutionalism with an actor-centred approach in 
their attempt to explain political guidance and self-organization in society 
(Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Additionally, they address the problem of how to 
choose which theory describes which behaviour, and conclude that analytical 
hiérarchisation is the most obvious and coherent way of solving the problem. 
An actor-centred explanation is not necessary when an institutional explanation 
sufficiently explains the empirical phenomenon. Where an actor-centred 
explanation is necessary, they argue that one should begin with simplified 
suppositions, which only need to be empirically tested once they fail to explain 
observed behaviour. Since the institutional context partly determines structures 
of relationships, motives of interaction and behavioural orientation, much is 
already known of the actor once one knows the institutional context (Mayntz 
and Scharpf 1995:66-67).
The institutional context goes a long way in explaining why a small state is not 
necessarily in a weak position, and why small size can even be an advantage 
and provide an actor with opportunities. However, institutions alone cannot 
always explain policy outcomes. The individual input of actors may be decisive 
as well. The rational choice approach can complement institutionalism in 
explaining the choice of behaviour of a given actor.
Before linking up the hypotheses with the theoretical approach more detailed 
explanations as to the exact meaning of institutionalism and rational choice 
theory are required.
The institutional approach to policy-making argues that institutions determine 
behaviour in their own right. Krasner defines institutionalism as follows:
'an institutional perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building 
blocks o f social and political life. The preferences, capabilities and basic self- 
identities o f individuals are conditioned by these institutional structures. Historical 
developments are path dependent: once certain choices are made they constrain future 
possibilities. The range o f options available to policymakers at any given point in time 
is a function o f institutional capabilities that were put in place at some earlier period, 




























































































However, the extent to which institutions determine behaviour depends very 
much on how one defines institutions. A broad conception of institutions as that 
employed by March and Olsen, for instance, as 'a number of interconnected 
rules and routines which define the adequate action as a relationship between a 
role and a situation' (Héritier 1991:33) leaves little scope for non- 
institutionally determined action or individual orientation of action. However, if 
an understanding and explanation of an individual actor's means of influence in 
their environment is sought, actor-related explanatory factors and institutionally 
related explanatory factors need to be differentiated. How else is one able to 
distinguish the different and specific causes of behaviour if institutions are all- 
encompassing?
A restricted conception of institutions provides a much more useful explanatory 
framework for the analysis of Luxembourg's means of influence in the EU. 
Such a conception is for instance that of Mayntz and Scharpf who define 
institutions as 'regulatory structures relating to the distribution and exercise of 
power, the determination of competences, the disposal of resources and the 
relationships of authority and dependence'(Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:40). 
Hence, in this study the term 'institution' specifically denotes EU principles, 
norms of behaviour, rules and decision-making procedures. For the purpose of 
identifying the sources of the means of influence of Luxembourg in the EU a 
clear distinction is thus made between, on the one hand, the EU institutional 
structure, and, on the other, the actor, i.e. the government, the ministerial 
departments, the groups or personalities representing the interest of 
Luxembourg and other non-Luxembourg participants in the process.
The durable nature of institutions carries the notion of 'path-dependency'. Early 
decisions become entrenched, they tend to create a precedence and determine 
options at a later point. There is a tendency for repetition. The adopted 
behaviour or problem-solving approach becomes routinized. Although the 
circumstances that gave rise to the initial decision may have changed, the 
approach adopted is not questioned and is nevertheless applied repetitively at 
later stages. 'Institutional structures are locked in even though there might have 
been some more efficient alternative.'(Krasner 1988:85-86)
Path-dependency has important implications for a 'weak' actor. Decisions taken 
under circumstances where the actor found itself in a stronger position and 
which the actor was able to influence in accordance with its preferences become 





























































































later behaviour and decisions. Although objectively the actor may not be in a 
position to influence later decisions in its favour, the perceptions and attitudes 
which ensue from an earlier decision lead to outcomes which are in the actor’s 
favour. Institutions can determine the status of an actor.
Theories of rational choice provide a different explanation of human behaviour. 
The rational choice approach is based on the assumption that 'human activity is 
goal oriented and instrumental and that individual and institutional actors tr\ 
to maximize their goal achievement'ÇTsebelis 1990:6). The actor assesses the 
costs and benefits of a given action with regard to a certain goal, and bases its 
preferences on this calculation. The classic rational choice approach has been 
criticized for its simplicity and its failure to incorporate other actors and the 
environment the actor finds itself in.
The criticisms of rational choice theory have been incorporated into a more 
sophisticated version of rational choice theory, so-called strategic rationality. 
which takes account of the dynamic character of preferences and the changing 
environment (Héritier 1991:30). For instance, Tsebelis argues that since actors 
are involved in nested games', meaning that the game an actor is involved in is 
embedded into other games, a rational actor approach must incorporate 
contextual and institutional factors to be able to demonstrate that an actor 
behaves rationally (Tsebelis 1990). Such a conception of multiple games may 
be particularly suited to the analysis of interaction and decision-making in the 
EU (cf. Benz 1992).
Contrarily to pure rational choice theory, one cannot assume that an actor is in 
possession of complete information and that its strategy takes all relevant 
factors into account. It makes more sense to conceive of actors as behaving 
according to bounded rationality. Actors seek to maximize their self-interest 
but are limited in their ability of controlling the outcomes because they are not 
in possession of all information affecting the outcomes of behaviour and 
interaction. One can nevertheless assume that an actor is acting strategically 
although its rational behaviour is based on incomplete information.
A rational actor approach does not necessarily imply that the actor is able to 
control outcomes totally. The notion of rational actor applied here conceives of 
the actor being able to reflect on a given situation, assess the costs and benefits 
which possible choices of action may carry, and base its choice of action on 
this assessment. The assessment is determined by numerous factors, some of 
which are institutionally related, some of which are the result of the actor's 
individual orientation. What really counts is that actors have an individual and 




























































































A rational actor approach need not necessarily conceive of the state as a unified 
actor. Such a conception would be misleading given the plurality of actors and 
their interests which constitute the 'state' (cf. Jordan and Richardson 1979; 
Richardson 1982). However, this does not lead to a total rejection of rational 
choice theory. The rationalist conception of the actor need not be applied to a 
unified state actor, but may nevertheless be applicable to particular actors 
which at some point or another are acting in the interest of the 'state', i.e. of 
Luxembourg. When defending the 'national' interest they behave as rational 
actors; they reflect on a given situation, assess the costs and benefits of a choice 
of action, and behave in a way that they perceive as best defending their 
interest.
The theoretical frameworks of institutionalism and rational-choice are not 
mutually exclusive. They can be coherently combined in a way that Mayntz and 
Scharpf have succeeded in doing. In a volume entitled Gesellschaftlische 
Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung, they have constructed a behavioural 
framework referred to as 'actor-centred institutionalism', which effectively 
incorporates institutionalist and rational choice assumptions (Mayntz and 
Scharpf 1995).
According to Mayntz and Scharpf, institutions have a significant effect on actor 
behaviour. It must be borne in mind that institutions are conceived of in a 
restricted sense as regulatory structures providing opportunities of action and 
restricting action. As such, institutions are independent variables, factors which 
may explain behaviour. However, institutions alone (in this restricted sense) 
cannot explain everything.
'The institutional framework does not encompass all types o f action and action­
relevant factors. Even where the institutional framework does determine action, it 
never does so exclusively.'(Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:49)
The individual behavioural- orientation of actors (individuelle 
Handlungsorientierung) is relevant to the remaining scope of action. This 
individuelle Handlungsorientierung is partly institutionally determined, and 
partly determined by contextually unrelated characteristics of individual or 
corporate actors, i.e. society- or history-related characteristics. The social unit 
(social class, ethnic group, profession, organization, state) from the perspective 





























































































the behavioural orientation of the actor (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:49). This 
paper resorts to a similar synthesis of institutionalist and rational choice 
theories in an attempt to substantiate the hypotheses.
As specified above, the theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism is 
particularly suited to an exploration of the means of influence of a small state in 
the European Union. It allows one to distinguish between actor-related sources 
of influence and institutionally related sources of influence. One can identify 
whether Luxembourg is able to have the desired effect on outcomes as a a result 
of characteristics, behaviour and strategies which are specific to itself, or 
whether its means of influence are a result of the particular institutional 
construction within which it operates.
The above theoretical framework needs to be applied to the subordinate 
hypotheses so that the theory may offer useful guidance at the stage when the 
hypotheses are explored by means of empirical data. Of course it will not be 
possible at this point to determine a priori and with absolute certainty which 
explanation -  institutional and/or rational-choice -  is best suited to which 
subordinate hypothesis. Detailed empirical analysis will be necessary for a 
more reliable interpretation of the phenomena. However, for the purpose of 
guidance the assumptions regarding the link between the different theoretical 
models and the different subordinate hypotheses need to be established.
(i) The first subordinate hypothesis suggests that principles of international 
law and federalist notions contained in the EU framework as well as the acquis 
communautaire may explain a small state's influence in the EU. Such legal 
resources can be pinned down clearly as institutional in the sense of 'regulatory 
structures relating to the distribution and exercise of power, the determination 
of competences, the disposal of resources and the relationships of authority and 
dependence' (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995: 40).” The institutional structure of the 
EU guarantees small state representation, which is a starting point for small 
state influence in the EU. The acquis communautaire is also part of the legal 
framework within which member states operate, and as such it is also an 
institutional factor.
Yet, the principle of equality of states and quasi-federalist notions of decision­
making have come under attack time and again. In the context of the
Mayntz and Scharpf go into great detail in specifying and classifying the factors that 
determine the behavioural orientation of a given actor. However, since these theoretical 
details go beyond the aim of this paper it will not be necessary to elaborate on this discussion 





























































































preparation to the 1996 IGC numerous proposals of institutional restructuring 
put forth may compromise the position of small states in the EU and undermine 
the basic principles. Smaller member states have continuously had to recall the 
attention of their partners to the principle of equality of states contained in the 
Treaties. Such was the case in a Benelux memorandum to the Lisbon summit in 
June 1992 in anticipation of the then forthcoming enlargement of the EU. 
Although they recognized institutional adjustments as inevitable, the Benelux 
states clearly stated that the basic principles of representation of states in the 
EU must not be changed (Europe Documents 1992).
As can be seen from the above examples, an institutionally related 
interpretation is insufficient to confirm the hypothesis which suggests that 
small state influence in the EU can be explained on the basis of the fundamental 
principles underlying the EU decision-making system and of the acquis 
communautaire. Although the institutional structure goes a long way in 
explaining why a small state may be influential in the EU, at times it has to be 
complemented by an actor-related explanation.
(ii) An institutionalist explanation can also be identified at the basis of the 
hypothesis that suggests that resources in one particular area may provide a 
state with overall influence although it may be deficient in overall quantitative 
resources. As specified in the hypothesis, within an institutional context the 
influence of an actor in one area may have implications for other areas. 
According to institutionalist theory of path-dependency, once behaviour has 
become institutionalized in one area it creates a precedence and has 
implications for other areas irrespective of different circumstances. Hence, an 
institutional framework set up according to the situation in one area where a 
small state has considerable resources -  as was the case for Luxembourg at the 
occasion of the foundation of the ECSC -  becomes entrenched, creates a 
precedence, and affects the way institutions are set up in other areas.
The institutional framework of the European Union has its roots in that of the 
ECSC. Given the production capacity of Luxembourg’s steel industry it was 
ranked among the top ten steel producers in the world in 1950. In spite of the 
microscopic size of the state, Luxembourg fully participated in the European 
construction process which began with the integration of the coal and steel 
industries, an area where Luxembourg's voice could not be ignored.
A month before the beginning of the conference, the French minister for European affairs, 
M. Bamier, put forth a proposal to reduce the number of members of the Commission from 





























































































Yet, path-dependency cannot necessarily explain all outcomes. Much depends 
upon the circumstances and on how the actor chooses to behave in a situation 
which provides them with a number of alternatives or opportunities. For 
instance, at the occasion of the creation of Euratom, Luxembourg declined full 
participation in the Commission of Euratom since it had no nuclear 
infrastructure and lacked expertise in this area (Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg 
1957a). The costs of full participation would have been too high. Hence, 
membership and participation in the ECSC did not automatically lead to an 
identical status for Luxembourg in Euratom. The actor's rational assessment of 
the situation prevented a path-dependent response to new circumstances. This 
assertion adds an actor-centred perspective to the institutional explanation.
The path-dependent explanation as to why special resources in one sector may 
provide a small state with overall influence also needs to be complemented by a 
rational actor explanation in order to explain why the fait accompli in one area 
may lead to a similar solution in a different area. For instance, as mentioned 
above, it was by no means evident that because Luxembourg had obtained full 
representation in the decision-making bodies of the ECSC it should be equally 
represented in those of the Common Market. The Luxembourg negotiators had 
to intervene vehemently on this issue to ensure that Luxembourg would obtain 
full representation in the new Community (Trausch 1989:442-448).
(iii) The third hypothesis, which suggests that a small state can be influential 
because its limited resources have behavioural implications which it can 
exploit, may be substantiated by means of institutional and rational actor 
theory. Initially the specific resources of the actor and the way these are 
perceived by other actors determine the behavioural structure among actors. In 
other terms, the non-competitive relationship among actors, the low-profile 
approach of a small state actor in negotiations, and the small state actor's role of 
neutral coordinator results from the actor-specific limited resources.
However, it is only within a certain institutional environment where 
relationships and behaviour are regulated that a small state can adopt a low- 
profile approach, and may find itself in a non-competitive relationship or in the 
role of a neutral coordinator. Hence, an institutionally-related explanation is 
necessary for an understanding of why limited resources indirectly provide a 
small state actor with opportunities of exercising influence.
In return, an actor-related explanation is necessary again if one seeks to explain 
how these behavioural situations are actually exploited by the small state actor. 





























































































(iv) The advantages in the EU decision-making process accruing to 
Luxembourg as a result of its small administration -  characterized by swift and 
efficient decision-making and considerable autonomy of officials -  need to be 
seen in the light of an actor-related approach.
Although at first sight administrative procedures can be interpreted in terms of 
institutional factors, in the context of this study it makes sense to consider them 
as actor-related variables since the term institution refers specifically to the EU 
institutional structure, as defined above. Since the aim in this study is to 
differentiate between, on the one hand, those sources of influence which derive 
directly from the actor itself, its behaviour, characteristics and strategies, and. 
on the other, those means of influence which are a result of the EU institutional 
structure, it is important to observe consistently the defining criteria set out 
above.
Hence, the small administration and the advantages and opportunities in the EU 
decision-making process resulting therefrom are interpreted as actor-specific 
characteristics. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that it is only within a 
regulated institutional environment, where decision-making and 
implementation follow certain set procedures and behaviour is predictable, that 
a small administration and its appending characteristics may offer a small state 
opportunities of influence and of defending its interests effectively. Hence, in 
the case of this hypothesis, the EU institutional context provides the backcloth 
for an actor-related explanation of small state influence.
(v) The hypothesis that bilateral and multilateral relations may affect the 
outcomes in a way favourable to the small state has a strong actor-related bias. 
The influence on outcomes is generated by a deliberate strategy on the part of 
the actor. However, once again an actor-related explanation is insufficient to 
explain the outcome. The institutional context has an effect on the way actors 
choose to behave. It is only within the EU institutional environment, which has 
a durable nature and which covers a wide scope of areas, that the relationship 
among member states is characterized by mutual trust and reciprocity and that 
coalitions are likely to be formed.
The following table has been set up to provide a simplified illustration of the 
distinction between actor-related and institutionally related explanations of the 




























































































Figure 2 Table of hypotheses
H y p o th ese s In s titu tio n a lly  R e la ted  
E x p la n a tio n
A c to r -R e la te d  E x p la n a tio n
(i) basic principles of the EU 
and acquis communautaire
-  regulatory structure of EU: 
guarantees small state 
representation
-  acquis communautaire 
constitutes secure gains for 
small state
-  institutional persistence
-  path-dependency
-  insistence on the part of 
the small state actor to 
have these principles 
incorporated into the 
European framework and 
respected thereafter
-  small state actor's efforts to 
preserve the acquis 
communautaire
-  playing on path- 
dependency
(i) special resources in one 
sector
path-dependency -  guidance on the part of 
actor
-  playing on path- 
dependency
(iii) behavioural implications 
of limited resources
institutional environment 
where behaviour and 
relationships are regulated
-  actor-specific limited 
resources
-  actor exploits institutional 
structure to maximize 
interests
(iv) small public 
administration
institutional environment 
where decision processes are 
regulated and predictable
actor-specific characteristics 
of a small public 
administration
(v) bilateral and multilateral 
relations
durability and scope of 
institutional environment
actor pursues strategy of 
fostering bilateral and 
multilateral relations and of 
forming coalitions
2. Luxembourg and the seat of the European institutions
The hypotheses and theoretical framework having been set out the paper now 
turns to the empirical analysis. An account is now given of how the different 
European institutions came to be sited in Luxembourg, how the seat has come 
under attack on a number of occasions, and how Luxembourg statesmen and 
negotiators have dealt with the issue. An attempt is made systematically to 
assess each episode with regard to the hypotheses of small state influence. In 
other terms, the aim is to identify at each occasion which hypotheses explain 





























































































In order to identify the link between the empircal study and the explanatory 
hypotheses this study has resorted to the methodological tool of collecting 
primary material relating to this particular issue -  such as press cuttings, 
official statements and speeches of politicians, Memoirs, governmental and 
Community reports and memoranda, EC Bulletins, EP resolutions, ECJ rulings. 
Council Decisions, and interviews -  as well as secondary material -  such as 
historical and current articles which analyze particular instances in depth -, in 
order to detect evidence of the different hypothetical explanations.
Currently Luxembourg is home to a number of institutions: the ECJ, the Court 
of Auditors, the European Investment Bank, some DGs of the Commission, the 
EP secretariat, the Official Publications Office, Eurostat and the European 
Translation Centre. In addition, meetings of the Council of the European Union 
are held in Luxembourg during the months of April, June and October. Hence, 
Luxembourg has come to be known as one of the three capitals of the European 
Union (Ministère d’Etat du Luxembourg 1993).
The seat issue is considered a matter of vital national interest in Luxembourg. 
The number of European officials working in the Grand Duchy is estimated to 
have an important impact on the Luxembourg economy (Centre d'Etudes 
Libérales 1980:45-52) as well as having implications for its international status 
and for the intellectual and cultural life of the country. Ever since the High 
Authority of the ECSC came to be located in Luxembourg in August 1952 
successive Luxembourg governments have followed a consistent policy of 
defending the location of certain European institutions in the Grand Duchy.
The seat of the High Authority of the ECSC
The siting of certain European institutions in the Grand Duchy can be traced 
back to the the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel Community. The 
cities of Liège, The Hague, Strasbourg, Turin, Saarbriicken and Luxembourg 
had each put in a bid to house the High Authority (Ministère d'Etat du 
Luxembourg 1952:124). Intensè manoeuvring and horse-trading went on 
behind the scenes. However, Bech, the Luxembourg foreign minister, chose to 
keep a low profile and not to intervene offensively on this issue. (Trausch 
1994:374)
Eventually, the signatory states met on 23 July 1952 to reach a decision on the 
siting of the High Authority. Schuman proposed Saarbriicken, thus hoping to 
solve the problem concerning the status of the Saar at the same time. Adenauer, 
however, was infuriated by this idea, considering it an astute way of separating 




























































































situation which was threatening to prevent the ECSC from commencing its 
work, Adenauer, whom Bech was apparently very close to, suggested to the 
Luxembourg foreign minister that Luxembourg pull out of the contest and 
present itself as provisional 'working place’." Monnet provides a first-hand 
account of the turn of events on 25 July after two days of intense and 
exhausting negotiations:
'At this point, Bech, who had appeared to he absent-minded, intervened: "I suggest we 
commence work immediately in Luxembourg: this will give us the time to think the 
whole thing over." Everyone was relieved. Hence, the seat o f the ECSC was 
"precariously" located in a small town which was to become the crossroads of 
Europe.' (Monnet 1976:433-434)
An important fact needs to be taken into account in the context of the Schuman 
Plan negotiations. The European integration process had begun in a sector in 
which Luxembourg's resources were comparable to those of other founding 
members. The production capacity of Luxembourg's steel industry ranked it as 
the tenth largest steel producer in the world in 1950 (Werner 1989:169). The 
following table illustrates the important resources Luxembourg disposed of in 
the sector upon which European integration was founded.
Table 2 Steel production in founding states o f ECSC in 1949 and 1950 (in 
million tonnes) (Trausch 1992:197)
Steel
production




1949 10913 9 152 3 489 428 2 055 2 272
1950 14019 8 652 3 778 490 2 362 2 451
The figures suggest that Luxembourg carried a certain weight in the steel sector 
and had a legitimate claim to equal status in the negotiations which directly 
concerned this area (Trausch 1992:197; Trausch 1994:374).
The above suggests that the level of influence Luxembourg exerted in the steel 
sector was widely disproportionate to the size of the state. Whereas during the 
negotiations leading to the Treaties of Rome a community of five members was 
envisaged -  Luxembourg being represented by Belgium through the Belgo- 
Luxembourg Economic Union (Trausch 1989:442-448) -  this was never the 
case in the Schuman Plan negotiations. Luxembourg was a full participant from
‘ Given Van Zeeland's concern that the agreement's temporary nature be emphasized, the 





























































































the very beginning, and its exceptional situation was even paid special attention
10to.
What hypothetical explanations of small state influence best explain how 
Luxembourg succeeded in obtaining that the seat of the High Authority be 
located in the Grand Duchy?
First of all, the low-profile approach adopted by Bech shed a favourable light 
upon the Luxembourg negotiators. Having kept out of the competitive broil 
among the other contenders to the seat, Luxembourg avoided creating 
apprehension towards it. The Grand Duchy was thus in a favourable position to 
take on the role of honest broker and to save the situation by 'offering' itself as 
provisional compromise solution.
This argument is further substantiated by the hypothesis that important 
advantages may accrue to a small state as a result of the fact that it finds itself 
in a non-competitive relationship with its partners. Luxembourg owed much to 
Adenauer's support and intervention in the crucial negotiations of 23 to 25 July 
1952, which carried all the more weight since the FRG had not placed a bid for 
a German city (Trausch 1994:376). Although Monnet’s account of the events in 
the night of 24 to 25 July suggest that Luxembourg's intervention was 
somewhat spontaneous, it was in fact the result of a Germano-Luxembourg 
manoeuvre behind the scenes. It was Adenauer who suggested to Bech that he 
pull Luxembourg out of the contest and propose the city as provisional seat. 
When Bech put forth the suggestion, Adenauer immediately backed him, 
leaving the other states to acquiesce in what seemed the best way out of the 
deadlock situation. In addition, the other states were all the more ready to agree 
since they nurtured no apprehensions towards Luxembourg. They had not 
succumbed under the weight of a powerful state, but had reached an agreement 
jointly to grant the seat on a precarious basis to the smallest partner.
The favourable Germano-Luxembourg bilateral relations in the years prior to 
the Schuman Plan negotiations have a lot to account for the outcome of the seat 
negotiations in August 1952. Bech had consistently promoted the relationship 
with its big brother to the east ever since West Germany had turned into a 
liberal democratic state. Bech met Adenauer in 1947, and the two statesmen 
came to share a close friendship. It was actually Bech who introduced Adenauer 
to the still very suspicious international circles (Trausch 1978:129). The 
familiarity and trust shared by Bech and Adenauer may go a long way in 
explaining the joint strategy elaborated by the two. It can be argued that the





























































































promotion of favourable bilateral relations helped Luxembourg obtain the seat 
of the High Authority.
Interestingly enough, the large state, i.e. the FRG. succeeded in defending its 
own interests by having a small state make a proposal which coincided with its 
own preferences. The German negotiators were desperate to keep the Saar out 
of a deal on the seat out of fear that this industrially productive area of 
Germany be separated from the FRG. The agreement on Luxembourg kept the 
Saar out of the line of fire for the time being. Hence, a large state, well aware of 
the potentials of a smaller partner, may seek to defend its own interests through 
the intermediary of the small state. Luxembourg takes on the role of honest 
broker, of neutral coordinator, putting forth compromise solutions, yet 
simultaneously defending its own interests.
The assumption that because Luxembourg was able to exert considerable 
influence in a special sector -  'special' because it is the sector upon which the 
integration process was founded -  it has been able to wield overall influence is 
very difficult to evaluate in the case of the seat of the European institutions. As 
has been demonstrated above, the seat of the High Authority came to be located 
in Luxembourg as a result of a deadlock in the negotiations which Luxembourg 
was able to take advantage of. The fact that Luxembourg disposed of 
considerable resources in the steel sector was apparently not of direct relevance 
in the negotiations on the location of the High Authority. One could argue, 
however, that its relevance is of a more indirect nature. Had Luxembourg not 
disposed of such important resources in the steel sector, it might not have 
participated fully in the negotiations in the first place. It might have been 
represented by Belgium through the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and 
might not have been able to seize the opportunity. On the other hand, this might 
have made Luxembourg the ideal compromise candidate for the seat in a 
struggle among the five. These imaginary scenarios illustrate just how difficult 
it is to trace this hypothetical explanation in the case of the seat of the 
institutions.
The validity of this hypothesis is probably limited to representational questions 
at the initating phase of the integration process. It forms the backcloth of 
Luxembourg's full participation in the integration process, but its direct 
relevance to a particular decision is doubtful.
The question of the Saar
Following the Franco-German accord in 1954 on the status of the Saar, which 




























































































urged the Luxembourg Government not to oppose the transfer. However. Bech 
is said to have reacted fiercely:
7 responded to Mr Saffroy that /  regretted that the interests o f my country seemed not 
to count in the eyes o f the French Government, and that 1 was determined more than 
ever to oppose the departure o f the ECSC from Luxembourg which no reason could 
justify.' (Trausch 1994:379)
Just two years after the High Authority had begun its work in Luxembourg, the 
Grand Duchy had come to consider the seat as a prerogative of its own and a 
question of national interest. The Luxembourg Government was determined not 
to let go. In addition, Luxembourg could count on the support of its Benelux 
partners, as the French minister Saffroy was well aware of (Ibid.).
The outcome of the referendum on the Saar in October 1955 settled the issue 
for the time being. The population was not in favour of a European status of the 
Saar, which had been a condition of the transfer of the seat of the ECSC to 
Saarbrticken. Hence, the High Authority remained in Luxembourg (Trausch 
1994:379-380).
Two of the above hypothetical explanations of how a small state succeeds in 
defending its interests are confirmed through this episode.
First of all, the close alliance Luxembourg shared with its Benelux partners 
guaranteed Luxembourg firm support when it came under the pressure of the 
French Government. Throughout the postwar period the Netherlands and 
Belgium have always been highly sensitive towards any possible domineering 
aspirations of France or Germany, and have always responded fiercely when 
they have perceived such intentions. The French minister Saffroy was well 
aware that Luxembourg did not stand alone when it defied the plan of France to 
have the High Authority located in Saarbrticken (Trausch 1994:379).
Secondly, this scenario illustrates how an institutional acquis already had 
developed, and how the small state could exploit this acquis. Although the High 
Authority had only been established in Luxembourg for two years, the location 
of the institution in the Grand Duchy was already considered an acquis which 
the small state considered as a vital interest, as a national prerogative. As soon 
as the decision had fallen that the High Authority would begin its work in the 
capital of Grand Duchy, the Luxembourg authorities went to great efforts to 
ensure that the High Authority had all it required for its proper functioning. The 





























































































disposal of the newly arrived European officials. From the very beginning the 
authorities aimed at consolidating the seat, of creating a strong institutional 
acquis. They were playing on path-dependency.
The Treaties of Rome
Following the signing of the Treaties of Rome the Council of ministers decided 
on 6/7 January 1958 to concentrate the three Communities on a single site. 
However, they were unable to decide on a location. Monnet had tried to 
convince Bech to play host to the single seat. However, the Luxembourg 
foreign minister was weary of the Grand Duchy being invaded by an army of 
Eurocrats. On the other hand, he was determined not to let go of those already 
there. The position on the question of the seat of the Luxembourg Government 
was clearly set out in the Chambre des Députés on 26 March 1958:
'What matters above all fo r Luxembourg is that it be clearly set out that the decision of 
1952 which envisaged a precarious establishment o f the seat o f the ECSC has been 
overtaken by events, whilst no new decision has been taken by the Six since 1952. 
Luxembourg has thus become the effective seat o f the ECSC. which cannot be removed 
from Luxembourg without unanimous approval.
It is equally recognized, and this is o f overriding importance, that the presence o f the 
ECSC in Luxembourg has given rise to a special situation in our country, a situation 
which touches upon political and moral as well as material interests. This situation 
cannot be ignored when the question o f establishing new institutions and o f eventually 
merging them in one single location is addressed.' (Werner 1991:14).
As Werner has commented in his Memoirs, 'Du précaire le siège était promu au 
provisoire]'{Ibid.) Luxembourg had declared that over time it had acquired a 
right to house certain institutions. This right could not be reversed. The 
institutional acquis had become established.
At the same occasion the Luxembourg Government officially declared that it 
would be willing to become the 'single seat', i.e. to host all institutions, as long 
as all member states were in favour of Luxembourg (Ibid.). However, the 
Belgian interest differed given the possibility of Brussels of becoming home to 
the European institutions. Luxembourg was not prepared to adopt an aggressive 
stance on this matter when this meant a confrontation with its economic and 
monetary partner with which it shared a very cooperative relationship." The fact 
that the member states were not all in favour of Luxembourg as single and 
definite seat of the European institutions played into the Government's hands
unofficial translation.




























































































since the population was somewhat distressed at the prospect of a 
’Europeanization' of Luxembourg, of being invaded by 'Europeans' and of 
loosing its national identity. Luxembourg wanted to retain the seat of the High 
Authority yet without having to become home to all future European 
institutions (Trausch 1994:380).
Luxembourg's attitude towards European integration has always been 
dominated by its desire for self-preservation. On the one hand, the European 
factor -  European integration and the presence of the institutions in the Grand 
Duchy -  have guaranteed its existence, yet, on the other hand, it has always 
been wary of being flooded by the 'European factor’ and of thus loosing its 
national identity. Hence, a delicate balance has always been sought between the 
encouragement of 'Europe' in Luxembourg and a concern for the preservation of 
the national identity.
A European federal district was thus out of question. However, the ministers of 
the six member states eventually agreed to set up the new Communities 
'provisionally' in Brussels whilst the ECSC would remain at its 'precarious' seat 
in Luxembourg.
Luxembourg was content with the outcome of the seat negotiations. It had been 
able to maintain the seat of the High Authority in the Grand Duchy, although it 
had obtained it five years earlier only on a 'precarious' basis, and it had 
managed to avoid becoming sole European capital, which might have 
compromised its national identity.
The EEC Treaty laid the legal basis for later decisions relating to the seat of the 
European institutions. Article 216 specifies that 'the seat of the Community 
shall be determined by common accord of the Governments of the Member 
States.' This implies that the institutions themselves have no authority on the 
matter and that decisions regarding the seat of the institutions can only be 
reached by unanimity among the member states.
The outcome of the negotiations on the seat in the context of the Treaties of 
Rome confirm the hypothesis of the institutional acquis. Luxembourg was able 
to preserve the location of the seat of the High Authority in its capital thanks to 
the logic of institutional persistence. Although it had initially been decided that 
the High Authority would only be 'precariously' located in Luxembourg, and in 
spite of the later agreement on a single seat, Luxembourg nevertheless retained 




























































































'Path-dependent patterns o f development are characterized by self-reinforcing positive 
feedback. Initial choices, often small and random, may determine future historical 
trajectories. Once a particular path is chosen, it precludes other paths, even if  these 
alternatives might, in the long run, have proven to be more efficient or adaptive.' 
(Krasner, 1988: 79)
The Merger Treaty of 1965
The failure of the Council of Ministers to take a definite decision on the seat 
issue in 1958 gave Luxembourg the chance further to consolidate the location 
of the European institutions in the Grand Duchy. Pierre Werner, the former 
Luxembourg prime minister, writes in his Memoirs that Luxembourg began to 
perceive an opportunity of retaining the seat in the long term. A wide-scale 
construction programme was embarked upon in order to provide the institutions 
with the necessary infrastructure (Werner 1991:12-13; Trausch 1994:380).
Given the inefficiency of the executives of the three Communities being split, 
suggestions of merging the institutions came on the agenda in 1963. 
Luxembourg took a firm stance on this matter, determined not to give up the 
gains it had made over the past ten years.
In a report drawn up towards the end of 1963 by Coreper, the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, on the consequences of a merger of the executives 
the importance of the seat of the High Authority for Luxembourg was 
acknowledged. " The report also suggested that a Merger Treaty would have to 
apply the principle of ’fair compensation' to a solution concerning the location 
of the seats of the European institutions (Werner 1991:49).
The Luxembourg Government came to envisage the seat of the EP as a fair 
political compensation and put forth this proposal once its right to 
compensation had been acknowledged (Werner 1991:49-50). Yet, given 
France's vehement opposition to the removal of the EP from Strasbourg, 
Luxembourg elaborated a different deal which would make the Grand Duchy 
the European judicial and financial. The Luxembourg negotiators managed to 
transform some sporadic material compensation proposals into a coherent and 
functional whole which would serve the long-term interests of the Grand Duchy 
(Werner 1991:56-58). In the Council meeting of 2 March 1965 the Luxembourg 
proposal was accepted without any significant amendments (Bull. CEE 1965b).
The report states that 'the problem of the location of the Community institutions and bodies 





























































































The Merger Treaty specifies that Luxembourg is to house the financial and 
judicial institutions of the European Community and that during the months of 
April, June and October, the Council shall hold its sessions in the Grand Duchy 
(OJ C152). In an official statement Werner declares that 7 am pleased with the 
results that have been achieved. On the whole the essence of Luxembourg's 
demands have been met.'" ( Bull. CE 1965) Although the Treaty specifies that 
the location of the seats in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg are merely 
provisional, it nevertheless consolidates the status of these cities as European 
capitals.
According to Trausch, Luxembourg owed much to the support it enjoyed from 
its partners (Trausch 1994:381). Throughout the negotiations leading to the 
merger of the executives Werner had actively lobbied the heads of state and 
government of the other member states. He held bilateral talks with the Italian 
prime minister Moro, the German chancellor Erhard and the Belgian prime 
minister Spaak, who all promised their support for Luxembourg demands of 
'fair compensation' (Werner 1991:50-56).
The outcome of this particular episode, which was favourable to Luxembourg, 
can be explained through three of the above hypotheses.
Once again, the institutional acquis carried important weight. At this point 
Luxembourg had been home to the High Authority for over a decade. Its 
presence in the Grand Duchy had become entrenched.
However, the logic of institutional persistence alone is insufficient to explain 
the consecutive establishment of European institutions in the Grand Duchy. The 
actor, i.e the Luxembourg authorities, had a subjective input into the process as 
well which had a direct effect on the end result. The ambitious construction 
plans embarked upon by the Luxembourg Government soon after the seat of the 
European institutions came to be established in the Grand Duchy had 
contributed to creating an institutional acquis. The Government provided vast 
construction grounds at Kirchberg, which lies across the valley from the city 
centre, and built a bridge linking up the future European centre with the city 
(Trausch 1994:381). These building initiatives were part of a deliberate strategy 
of consolidating its gains, of playing on path-dependency, as encouraged by 
Albert Wehrer, one of Bech's closest advisers. As Trausch has pointed out, 
'Wehrer suggests an offensive strategy to Bech: anticipating the ECSC’s wants 
and creating new “accomplished facts” which favour the maintenance of the 






























































































In addition, Luxembourg could count on the support of Italy, Germany and 
Belgium, with whom it found itself in a non-competitive relationship over this 
issue. None of these states perceived a threat in Luxembourg's claims to fair 
compensation. Aware of the importance attached to the presence of the 
European institutions in the Grand Duchy, the heads of state of Italy, Germany 
and Belgium backed Werner in his demands for an equitable replacement of the 
High Authority. France, however, found itself in a competitive relationship with 
Luxembourg as a result of the threat it perceived in Luxembourg's demand for 
the seat of the EP, which was located in Strasbourg. Luxembourg's resources in 
this particular instance were considerable. It had the backing of other member 
states and could substantiate its claims with the acquis communautaire. On the 
other hand, so could France resort to the acquis communautaire, which it too 
had consolidated. In addition, France enjoyed the support of the MEPs in 
Strasbourg. In this contest Luxembourg eventually gave in as a result of the 
pressure it came to bear and of its strong desire not to cause apprehension on 
the part of the French, who also had a legitimate claim. Nevertheless, it was 
able to wrangle a different bargain out of the negotiations, a solution supported 
by all member states.
This episode also reveals the importance of the bilateral relations Luxembourg 
had nurtured with the other member states. During the period from the end of 
1964 to April 1965, the Luxembourg prime minister intensified his relations 
with his counterparts from other member states. Werner drew their attention to 
the importance of the issue to Luxembourg and managed to rally Italy, 
Germany and Belgium to the cause of the Grand Duchy. It is difficult to 
evaluate to what extent the support of its partners contributed to the final 
solution which was favourable to Luxembourg. However, the fact that these 
member states openly showed an understanding for Luxembourg's situation 
reinforced Luxembourg's cause and gave the Grand Duchy additional weight to 
defend its interest.
The seat of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund
The plans in 1969/70 to create an economic and monetary union (as set out in 
the Werner report) led to the foundation of a European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund in 1973. On the basis of the Merger Treaty, which had made Luxembourg 
the 'provisional' home of financial institutions, the seat of the Fund was to be 
located in the Grand Duchy. However, although the legal provisions were clear 




























































































The German and French heads of state publicly voiced their doubts about the 
practicality of a seat of the Fund in Luxembourg. The Council of Ministers of 
Finance met on 6 March 1973 to discuss the location of the Fund. Whereas the 
small states -  the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland -  rallied behind 
Luxembourg, France, Germany and the UK expressed their reserves and Italy 
declared it would follow the majority (Werner 1991:143).
However, Werner stood firmly against the pressure from Germany, France and 
the UK and addressed a letter to the President of the Council of ministers of 
finance stating that Luxembourg would veto the foundation of the Fund unless 
the words of the Merger Treaty were respected (Werner 1991:144).
Meanwhile France and Germany approached the Luxembourg prime minister 
on a bilateral level expressing their concerns regarding the compatibility of 
certain 'dubious' activities of Luxembourg's financial centre and the location of 
the Fund in the Grand Duchy. Werner consistenly drew their attention to the 
'loyal fulfilment of engagements taken'' yet promised to examine the problem 
(Wemer 1991:145).
In the Council of ministers meeting on 22 March Luxembourg repeated its 
threat of blocking the foundation of the Fund unless the Merger Treaty was 
respected and insisted on the judicial aspect of the commitments made in 1965. 
It was backed by the four small states -  Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Ireland -  who reminded the large states that the 'acquis communautaire' 
must not be violated (Wemer 1991:145). It was eventually agreed on 2 April 
1973 that a decision on the seat would be taken in conformity with the Merger 
Treaty regardless of any other considerations.
In his Memoirs Wemer suggests that Luxembourg reached a deal with Germany 
and France linking the issue of the location of the Fund with that of the 
activities of Luxembourg's financial centre:
'Whilst approving the agreement on the provisional seat on 2 April, the French and 
German delegations made a unilateral declaration demanding that the legislation on 
holdings be amended.' (Wemer 1991:147)
Although Luxembourg promised to consider the matter seriously, it made no 
definite commitments that it would bow to French and German preferences. 
Given that the Luxembourg financial legislation was not amended according to 






























































































banking sector continued to flourish in the Grand Duchy, it seems that the 
French and German declarations on an amendment of the Luxembourg 
legislation were in fact a face-saving device resorted to by France and Germany 
when they found themselves obliged to bow to the legal commitments of 1965.
According to Werner, Luxembourg was satisfied with the outcome of the 
negotiations. The Grand Duchy had succeeded in asserting the principles 
contained in the Treaty of 1965 whilst not having to paralyse any further the 
process of economic and monetary integration, which it strongly supported 
(Werner 1991:146). The Council resolution on the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund fixing the seat of the Fund in Luxembourg was adopted on 
25 June 1973 (Bull. EC 1973a).
The above episode confirms the hypothesis that the small state will resort to the 
acquis communautaire, to the legal commitments made by all member states, in 
an attempt to defend its interests. Although France and Germany attempted to 
exert pressure on their tiny neighbour, they eventually had to bow to the words 
of the Treaty.
The bilateral relations the Luxembourg Government nurtured with its partners 
are also instrumental in explaining the outcomes of the above events. The 
concerns France and Germany had towards Luxembourg's financial legislation 
were dealt with bilaterally. Whilst drawing the attention of France and Germany 
to the legal commitments made, Werner was able to offer them a face-saving 
way out of the situation by reaching a bilateral accord with them.
Luxembourg also owes the support brought towards it by the other smaller 
member states to the favourable bilateral or multilateral relations it 
consistently fostered with them. None of them had any reasons to feel any 
apprehensions towards the smallest member state and to oppose the location of 
the Fund in the Grand Duchy. Rather they were alarmed at the underhand 
attempts of the two big powers to disregard the legal commitments made at the 
expense of a small state.
The seat of the European Parliament
The EP secretariat came to be established in Luxembourg in 1952 following a 
decision of the Assembly (later EP) which deemed it most practical that its 
secretariat be sited in the same place as the High Authority and its secretariat. 




























































































practical reasons. * Ever since, the EP generally holds its plenary sessions in 
Strasbourg and its secretariat operates in Luxembourg. The parliamentary 
committees meet in Brussels so as to be in proximity of the Commission.
Beginnning in 1981, the EP has adopted a number of resolutions and its Bureau 
has taken measures to render its functioning more efficient by reviewing the 
operation of the EP general secretariat so as to make it more compatible with 
the holding of parliamentary sessions in Strasbourg and with the meetings of 
the political groups and committees in Brussels (Bull. EC 1981b; OJ C234; OJ 
C l61; OJ C47; PE A2.316 1988). The Grand Duchy has perceived these 
resolutions and decisions as blatant attempts to remove the secretariat from 
Luxembourg, and on each occasion brought an action before the ECJ (Case 
230/81; Case 108/83; Joined Cases C-218/88 and C-39/89).
The Court generally ruled in favour of the EP on the grounds that the 
parliament must be able to ensure its proper functioning and has the right to 
self-organization. ° However, the Court added that the transfer of staff must in 
no way compromise the seat of the secretariat in Luxembourg since this would 
be in breach of Article 4 of the decision of 8 April 1965 (Case 230/81; Joined 
Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89). Only in the case of the Von Hassel resolution of 
20 May 1983 did the ECJ rule in favour of Luxembourg since this resolution 
contained a specific statement suggesting that the seat of the secretariat (Case 
108/83).
Although in most cases Luxembourg failed to have the resolutions declared null 
and void, the Court Judgments re-confirm the location of the secretariat in 
Luxembourg, and as such are an addition to the acquis communautaire in the 
form of case law. However, as the EP's power of internal organization has been 
sanctioned by the Court, the Parliament has been given broad leeway in 
deciding where to concentrate its work. Although the Court has been careful to 
guard the prerogative of the member states to decide on the location of the seat, 
the Judgment effectively sanctions a gradual transfer of the seat of the general 
secretariat of the EP to Brussels. '
The latest key episode over the seat of the EP arose at the occasion of the 
Edinburgh summit of 11/12 December 1992, where a decision was reached on 
the definite location of seat of all the European institutions. This will be 
discussed under the following sub-heading since the decisions reached at this
Strasbourg symbolizes Franco-German reconciliation. In addition, the hemicycle of the 
Council of Europe provided the Assembly with the necessary infrastructure.





























































































occasion concerned the location of a number of other institutions as well as the 
siting of the European Parliament and its secretariat.
Once again the hypothesis is confirmed that the small state finds means of 
defending its interests by relying on the legal framework of the EU. For a start. 
Luxembourg could rest on the legal force of Article 216 of the EEC Treaty, 
Article 189 of the Euratom Treaty and Article 77 of the ECSC Treaty, which 
specify that a decision on the location of the European institutions requires 
unanimity among the member states. Neither the EP nor a majority of member 
states could decide to transfer the seat of the secretariat of the EP to Brussels or 
to Strasbourg at the expense of Luxembourg without the latter’s approval.
In addition, the legal framework has provided Luxembourg with a means of 
defending gains already made. Whenever the Parliament adopted a resolution or 
took measures which compromised the location of the EP secretariat in the 
Grand Duchy, the Luxembourg authorities could resort to the ECJ. Although 
the gradual erosion of the seat has not been prevented given the pressure of the 
need for greater efficiency, the Court Judgments have nevertheless helped to 
consolidate Luxembourg’s right. The Judgments constitute an addition to the 
acquis communautaire. In spite of the fact that they sanction the EP's 
endeavours to render its work more efficient, which somewhat undermines the 
seat of the general secretariat in the Grand Duchy, explicit mention is made that 
the seat of the EP cannot be removed from Luxembourg without its consent. 
Written statement of this kind confirm and reinforce the legitimacy of the state's 
prerogatives and can be resorted to by the state in defence of its interests.
Edinburgh and Brussels summits
The Treaty on European Union signed in February 1992 envisaged the creation 
of a number of new European institutions and agenciesthe location of which 
gave rise to intense bargaining among the member states throughout 1992 and 
1993. Luxembourg perceived the opportunity of further consolidating its role as 
European capital by ensuring that some of these new bodies and departments be 
located in the Grand Duchy. In addition, in the context of the decision on the
The new institutions and agencies are as follows: the European Monetary Institute and the 
future European Central Bank; Europol, and the Europol Drugs Unit; the European 
Environment Agency; the European Training Foundation; the Office for Veterinary and Plant- 
Health Inspection and Control; the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction; the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, the Agency for 
Health and Safety at Work; the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (trade marks, 
designs and models), including its Board of Appeal. At the same time a decision was also 
pending on the location of a further two new bodies, i.e. the Translation Centre and the 




























































































location of the new institutions and agencies, a definite decision on the existing 
institutions was called for. Hence, the negotiations were of overriding 
importance to Luxembourg.
On the basis of the provisions on the location of financial institutions annexed 
to the Merger Treaty of 1965, Luxembourg had a legal claim to the seat of the 
future European Central Bank, which it correspondingly invoked. 
Luxembourg's claim is mentioned time and again in the press and in official 
speeches during the first half of 1992 (Die Welt 1992; Saarbriicker Zeitung 
1991; Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg 1992a; Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg 
1992b). However, in the follow-up to the Lisbon summit of 26/27 June 1992, 
the Luxembourg Government changed its approach and thereafter restrained 
from taking an offensive stance over this matter. Ensuingly, Luxembourg’s 
claim rarely came to be mentioned in the press thereafter. Luxembourg 
appeared to have given up the race for the Central Bank.
Following the Lisbon summit, the Luxembourg foreign minister, J. F. Poos, set 
out Luxembourg's position on the issue of the seat in the Chambre des Députés 
at the occasion of the parliamentary debate over the ratification of the Treaty on 
European Union on 2 July 1992;
In the question o f the seat the dice have not yet been thrown and Luxembourg retains 
all its assets. Luxembourg's position at this point is clear and straight-forward. It can 
be summarized into four points:
1. We have taken note with satisfaction o f the proposal o f the Portuguese presidency 
which recognizes Luxembourg's right to house the Office fo r  Community Patents, a 
judicial and quasi-judicial body, on the basis o f the decision o f 1965, but we have not 
yet agreed to the Portuguese package;
2. The acquis o f 1965 must be completely and totally maintained, in particular with 
regard to the Commission services based in Luxembourg and to the Council meetings 
held in our capital:
3. A definite agreement must set out clearly that the entire secretariat o f the EP 
remain established in Luxembourg;
4. In order to reach a compromise solution, the Luxembourg Government is willing to 
show flexibility, as we have shown in our memorandum forwarded to President 
Andreotti.' (Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg 1992c:20)
It is striking that at this point no mention was made of Luxembourg's legal 
claim to the seat of the ECB. In return, the Luxembourg Government focused 
its objectives on obtaining a definite establishment of the seat of the EP 
secretariat in the Grand Duchy and a confirmation of the institutional acquis 





























































































holding of Council meetings in Luxembourg. It had also perceived the 
opportunity of obtaining the seat of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market as suggested in the 'non-paper' put forth by the Portuguese presidency. 
Yet at the same time, the Luxembourg Government professed a flexible 
approach and its willingness to reach a compromise.
According to Ben Fayot, the leader of the Luxembourg Socialist Party, the 
Letzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechter Partei (LSAP), once Luxembourg 
realized that the three large states, Germany, France and Britain, were to reach 
an agreement on the location of the Central Bank, it pulled out of the contest. 
Luxembourg's opportunities as a rule were great, he claimed, when the big 
states disagreed and the Grand Duchy could step in as a compromise solution. 
However, when the views of the large states concorded. Luxembourg had best 
adopt a low-profile to avoid coming across as a nuisance and create 
apprehensions (Interview 1996).
Fayot has pointed out that given the general acceptance of the principle of 
polycentrism with regard to the location of European institutions, the aim of 
which is to bring the Union closer to the people and to cure it of the image of an 
impersonal central bureaucracy, the European Union was seeking to construct a 
package deal which distributed the new agencies and institutions evenly among 
the member states. Under these circumstances Luxembourg preferred not to 
adopt a selfish attitude which would only serve to cause apprehension towards 
it (Ibid.).
The position adopted by the Luxembourg representatives in the seat 
negotiations needs to be seen in the context of an internal Luxembourg political 
debate. There was a growing sense among politicians that Luxembourg's hold 
on the EP secretariat was weakening. According to Fayot, some persons had 
suggested -  although never openly -  that Luxembourg should popose giving up 
the seat of the EP secretariat in return for the ECB and for the Office for 
Harmonization. However, this approach would have been extremely delicate. It 
would have conveyed a willingness on the part of Luxembourg to give up the 
seat of the EP secretariat, and thus would have weakened Luxembourg's 
bargaining position. The stakes were extremely high. If the large states were to 
agree on the location of the ECB amongst themselves, Luxembourg's chances 
would vanish into thin air, and it would have compromised the seat of the EP 
secretariat. It would be easier for Luxembourg to hold on to the acquis than to 
fight for a new gain (Ibid.).
These calculations proved right in the follow-up of events which culminated in 




























































































of 29 October 1993. Prior to the Edinburgh summit the heads of state and 
government of France, Britain and Germany paid one another bilateral visits, 
which eventually ended in them striking a deal. Eager to make the British 
presidency of the EU a success and to retain a good relationship with Germany, 
Major, renounced on the seat of the ECB (Le Monde 1992). This left Germany 
and France to reach a straightforward deal: in return for the location of the ECB 
in Frankfurt, Kohl was ready to agree that Strasbourg be confirmed as capital of 
the EP. The decision in favour of Strasbourg unblocked negotiations on the 
siting of the new institutions and agencies of the EU since Mitterrand had 
threatened to veto any other decisions unless Strasbourg be confirmed as capital 
of the EP (Financial Times 1992). Hence, the member states were finally able 
to reach a decision on the definite location of the seats of the existing European 
institutions. Basically, they confirmed the status quo giving it a definite nature. 
Strasbourg was confirmed as capital of the EP, whilst the general secretariat of 
the EP was maintained in Luxembourg (Bull. EC 1992).
Although the decision reached at Edinburgh did not determine the location of 
the new institutions and agencies of the European Union, it did specify that a 
later decision would take into account the 'advantages of the above provisions 
to the Member States concerned', and would give 'priority to the Member States 
who do not at present provide the sites of Community institutions.’ {Ibid.)
The final decision on the location of the seats of the new 'bodies and 
departments of the European Communities and of Europol' was taken in 
Brussels on 29 October 1993 (OJ C232). It was decided that the future 
European Central Bank would be located in Frankfurt and that the Translation 
Centre will be set up in Luxembourg. It was added that 'The Member States 
undertake to support the candidacy of Luxembourg as seat of the Common 
Appeal Court for Community patents J . Also the Commission confirmed that 'it 
intends to consolidate the establishment of those of its departments that are 
located in Luxembourg.' {Ibid.)
However, the Office for Harmonization went to Spain instead of Luxembourg, 
in spite of the proposition of the Portuguese presidency that it be located in the 
Grand Duchy. However, as Fayot pointed out above, given the principle of 
polycentrism and the need to construct a fair package deal, Luxembourg was 
not in the position to place high and selfish demands. It was explicitly decided 
at Edinburgh that a later decision on the location of the new institutions would 
give priority to those member states which did not yet house any institutions. 
Besides, if Luxembourg had insisted on obtaining the seat of the Office for 
Harmonization as well as the Translation Centre and the Common Appeal 




























































































apprehension on the part of other member states, an attitude it has always been 
anxious to prevent.
The Luxembourg negotiators were content with the outcome of the 
negotiations, which were considered to have consolidated the seat of the 
institutions in Luxembourg (Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg 1993). The earlier 
decisions on the seat, the nature of which was provisional, had been replaced by 
a definite decision which sealed Luxembourg's status as one of the three 
European capitals.
However, the definite decision on the site of the general secretariat of the EP 
does not appear to have prevented a further erosion of its seat in Luxembourg. 
For reasons of efficiency personnel of the EP secretariat are periodically 
transferred from Luxembourg to Brussels. The EP is able to justify this on the 
basis of its right to self-organization, as confirmed by Court Judgments. At the 
occasion of a visit of the president of the EP, Klaus Hiinsch, to Luxembourg on 
24 November 1995, a working group of the EP and of the Luxembourg 
Government was set up to address the problem. Both parties are seeking a 
solution which takes into account the decision reached at Edinburgh. Jean- 
Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg prime minister, and Hiinsch seem to have 
concluded a deal: whereas Hansch guaranteed that a minimum number of 
parliament officials would remain in Luxembourg over the next ten years, 
Juncker promised the EP Luxembourg's support for its participation as observer 
in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Juncker emphasized in the 
Luxembourg press that the EP has a right to flexible work organization as 
confirmed by the ECJ. He also pointed out that the number of European 
officials working in the Grand Duchy had increased by 26,8 % since 1985 as a 
result of successive enlargements (Luxemburger Wort 1995).
Luxembourg's approach to the issue of the seat of the general secretariat of the 
EP has been consistent throughout. Well aware of the lack of efficiency ensuing 
from the divided workplace of the EP, Luxembourg realistically recognizes the 
need for a part of the services of the EP secretariat to be based in Brussels, 
where meetings of parliamentary committees are held once to four times a 
month. However, in the meantime the small state has been concentrating all its 
efforts on guaranteeing that its rights will not be ignored in the course of 
events. As Werner has pointed out:
'Nobody doubts that the working conditions o f the Parliament, which are the result of 
historical developments, are not ideal and that they will have to be remedied one day 




























































































consideration o f acquired rights, i.e. with due respect to the historical seats.' (Werner 
1991:312)"
The main aim of Luxembourg has been to assert its role as a European capital. 
As long as it is guaranteed fair compensation for the loss of European 
institutions the Grand Duchy shows a readiness to compromise since the 
guiding principle of the Government is to preserve the equivalent of the 
institutional acquis (Trausch 1994:384). As the number of European officials 
based in Luxembourg has increased from 1,634 in 1965 to 7,260 in 1993, and 
as further increases are expected as a result of future enlargements and of 
natural institutional growth, the Luxembourg authorities are content with the 
present arrangements. The fact that the Government has recently embarked 
upon further construction works at the Kirchberg European Centre is indicative 
of its confidence in the future of Luxembourg as one of the European capitals 
{Luxemburger Wort 1996b).
The outcome of this latest episode of the seat confirm a number of the 
hypothetical explanations of the means of influence of Luxembourg in the EU.
Throughout these crucial negotiations Luxembourg took a low-profile 
approach with the aim of not creating apprehension and coming across as a 
nuisance. It deemed that its interests were best served by not placing its 
demands too high. As long as it assumed disagreement among the three large 
states to be likely on the issue of the location of the ECB, it perceived a chance 
of obtaining the seat. Had this been the case, Luxembourg would have been 
able to step in as a neutral coordinator and an ideal compromise candidate, as it 
had in 1952. However, once it became clear to the Luxembourg negotiators that 
Britain, France and Germany were likely to reach an agreement, they realized 
that they would be compromising Luxembourg's bargaining position by 
insisting on the legal claim. Hence, under these circumstances the best way of 
defending its interests was to resort to the institutional acquis. As pointed out 
above, it was going to be easier for Luxembourg to preserve the gains it had 
already made and consolidate them by assuring them a definite nature than to 
make further demands. The fact that the Luxembourg authorities considered it 
dangerous to suggest giving up the seat of the EP in return for the ECB 
underlines their awareness of the weight and potency of the institutional acquis. 
Luxembourg's best weapon under precarious circumstances was to insist on the 






























































































The aim of Part 3 is twofold. Having set out the hypothetical and the theoretical 
frameworks of the study in Part 1, and having analyzed the empirical facts with 
regard to the hypothetical explanations of small state influence in the EU in 
Part 2, the paper now attempts to draw some general and theoretical 
conclusions from the preceding analysis.
First, the hypothetical explanations of small state influence in the EU are 
assessed with regard to the case study on the seat of the institutions. In other 
terms, the aim is to identify those hypothetical explanations which carry most 
weight in this particular empirical study and to explain why the remaining 
hypotheses are of limited value in this case.
Secondly, the study is assessed from the point of view of the theoretical 
framework adopted, i.e. that of actor-centred institutionalism. An attempt is 
made to answer the question whether Luxembourg has been able to defend its 
interest in this specific empirical study as a result of institutionally related or 
actor-related factors in the hope of underlining the insights that can be gained 
from an actor-centred institutionalist approach.
Luxembourg and the seat of the European institutions: assessment of the 
hypothetical framework
The case study on Luxembourg and the seat of the European institutions has 
revealed the explanatory weight of a number of the hypotheses of small state 
means of influence. In particular, the hypothesis that the small state actor relies 
on the acquis communautaire, in this case the institutional acquis, carries 
considerable weight. Whenever changes were imminent and threatened to 
undermine the small state's position, Luxembourg consistently resorted to the 
acquis. In addition, the logic of institutional persistence and of path- 
dependency explains why Luxembourg was able to preserve the gains once 
made, consolidate them and make further gains.
The hypothesis that the small state adopts a low-profile approach in 
negotiations as a means of defending its interests also carries considerable 
weight in explaining the outcomes of this particular case study. Luxembourg 
has consistently sought to remain out of the limelight and not to place high 
demands on its partners. It has been anxious to avoid apprehensions towards it.
Luxembourg has also been able to take advantage of the non-competitive 




























































































the role of a neutral coordinator, situations which both result from its small 
size and limited resources.
The bilateral and multilateral relationships the Grand Duhcy has promoted 
actively have considerable explanatory scope throughout the study of the seat 
issue. On a number of occasions the Grand Duchy has been seen to reach a 
bilateral deal with another member state or to obtain the support of its partners 
as a result of a common interest. The alliances thus formed have been useful as 
a backing to Luxembourg when it has sought to defend its interests.
None of the above hypothetical explanations alone is sufficient to explain 
Luxembourg's present status as one of the three European capitals. The 
importance of the institutional acquis and of the ability of the small state to play 
on path-dependency need to be emphasized though since these factors appear as 
a guiding and recurring theme across the numerous episodes relating to the seat 
of the European institutions. However, a full understanding of how 
Luxembourg has managed to become home to many of the EU institutions 
necessitates a combination of the above hypotheses, since other factors at times 
carry considerable weight on the outcome of particular episodes.
The hypotheses that special resources on one particular sector may provide 
Luxembourg with important overall means of influence, and that its small 
administration may have substantial implications for the Grand Duchy's ability 
of defending its interests have not proven to have had explanatory weight in 
this particular case study. The validity of the hypothesis relating to special 
resources is probably limited to representational matters. Its applicability to the 
seat issue is doubtful.
In return, the hypothesis that its small administration, which entails swift and 
efficient decision-making, may provide Luxembourg with considerable means 
of defending its interests cannot be discarded at this point. A number of 
political scientists and writers have suggested that the size of a public 
administration in a small state may constitute one of its main assets. Unlike 
large states it is not impeded by lengthy and cumbersome decision procedures. 
Short lines of communication and informal relations promote prompt and 
efficient decision-making (Skuhra 1983; Vogel 1983; Arthur Anderson 1993).
This hypothesis can be applied to the case of Luxembourg. Merten-Beissel, 
Hoscheit and Weyrich, Bichler, and de Muyser have studied the Luxembourg 
administration and have identified its policy style (Merten-Beissel 1987; 
Hoscheit and Weyrich 1988; Bichler 1994; de Muyser 1969). These authors 




























































































resources as well as the prevalence of negotiated solutions and of consensus 
among the different political actors. The Luxembourg administration is 
extremely decentralized. High officials and ministers enjoy considerable 
autonomy within their respective policy areas. Relationships between ministers 
and civil servants tend to be informal, the latter enjoying direct access to their 
respective minister. The elaboration of the Luxembourg position towards EU 
proposals is the result of a very decentralized process. Very often the Ministry 
directly concerned enjoys complete autonomy in adopting a position. Although 
the competence theoretically lies with the Foreign Ministry, it is even often 
bypassed since it does not have the necessary expertise to evaluate the 
proposals efficiently. The Luxembourg permanent representatives to the EU 
play a key role in the elaboration of the Luxembourg position on EU issues. 
They too enjoy considerable independence and freedom of manoeuvre, leaving 
only the very 'hot' issues to the Minister to decide upon. Most Luxembourg 
permanent representatives remain in Brussels throughout their career (de 
Muyser 1969). This durability promotes a profound knowledge of and 
familiarity with the intricacies of European decision-making. As a result, their 
judgement carries great weight and has a direct incidence on the position taken 
by the Luxembourg Government.
Hence, the studies on the Luxembourg administration suggest that its small size 
may promote swift and efficient adjustment to change. Yet an assessment of the 
validity of this hypothesis in the case of Luxembourg and the seat of the 
European institutions requires a great deal of primary information and material. 
It will be necessary to interview persons directly involved in decisions relating 
to the seat. Hence, at this point it is too early to draw any substantial 
conclusions with regard to this hypothesis.
For an understanding of the means of influence of Luxembourg in the EU in 
general it will be necessary to explore the validity of the hypothetical 
explanations through a different type of European decision-making process 
involving actors at different levels. An analysis of the elaboration of a 
particular Community directive of primary importance to Luxembourg would 
be a useful way of further investigating the hypotheses.
Luxembourg and the seat of the European institutions: assessment of the 
theoretical framework
Having explained how Luxembourg managed to secure its status as one of the 
three European capitals, the paper now addresses the question whether this 
outcome is the result of actor-related or institutionally related factors. Have 




























































































of characteristics particular to the actor and of the behaviour and strategy of the 
actor, i.e. of Luxembourg? Or is Luxembourg's status as European centre the 
result of institutional structures and their enduring nature?
According to actor-centred institutionalism, institutions have a significant effect 
on outcomes. They provide opportunities of action and restrict action. However, 
institutions do not explain everything. The individual input of the actor is 
relevant as well. In what way does this theoretical perspective clarify the 
sources and means of influence of Luxembourg in the EU in the case of the seat 
of the institutions?
The hypothetical explanations need to be explored bearing in mind the 
distinction between actor-related means of influence and institutionally related 
means of influence. The first hypothesis which suggests that Luxembourg has 
been able to defend its interests as a result of the acquis communautaire is an 
institutionally related argument in the sense that it confirms the logic of 
institutional persistence and the theory of path-dependency. However, the 
explanation is actor-related to the extent that the actor takes advantage of the 
institutional structure to further its interests. When the actor plays on path- 
dependency or invokes the legal framework to defend its interests, the outcome 
is also a result of a conscious assessment of the situation on the part of the actor 
and a consequent choice of behaviour or strategy. The individual input of the 
actor has important implications as well.
The non-competitive relationship the small state finds itself in, the low-profile 
approach and the role of neutral coordinator which it takes on are all the result 
of the particular characteristics of the actor, i.e. its small size and limited 
resources, and are thus actor-related explanations. The advantages the small 
state reaps from these behavioural implications of small size are also actor- 
related since they consist of a deliberate and well-assessed strategy embarked 
upon by the actor. However, it cannot be ignored that the effectiveness of these 
strategies may depend upon the institutional environment in which the actor 
finds itself. For instance, a low-profile approach might be pointless if it was not 
carried out in the context of an institutionally stable environment where 
behaviour is regulated and outcomes are calculable. An element of institutional 
certainty is required for these strategies to be effective.
Finally, the fostering of bilateral and multilateral relations as a means of 
defending its interests is an actor-related explanation since it consists of a 
deliberate strategy pursued by the actor in order to strengthen its position. Yet, 
the institutional context cannot be ignored since it has an important effect on 




























































































institutional environment is conducive to mutual trust and reciprocity among 
actors which render the formation of coalitions more likely.
The preceding analysis has revealed that the institutional structure goes a long 
way in explaining why a small state is able to defend its interests and obtain the 
desired results. The legal framework of the institution constitutes an important 
resource for the small state, a gain which cannot easily be reversed. Institutional 
persistence can be advantageous to the small state once it has obtained a 
favourable position within the existing institutional framework. However, the 
outcomes cannot be fully explained unless one complements the institutional 
framework with an actor-related approach. Institutions determine outcomes but 
there is guidance on the part of the actor. The actor takes advantage of the 
institutional setting to maximize its interests in the way that it plays on path- 
dependency or assesses the situation and adopts suitable bargaining tactics. 
Actor-centred institutionalism incorporates both the weight of institutions as 
well as guidance on the part of the actor, and thus offers a comprehensive 































































































Arthur Anderson & Co., S. A. (1993) Luxembourg. Situation et défis. Vision pour demain. 
Luxembourg: Editions Promoculture.
Baldwin, D. (1989) Paradoxes o f Power. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Benz, A. (1992) 'Mehrebenen-Verflechtung: Verhandlungsprozesse in verbundenen
Entscheidungsarenen', in Benz. A., Scharpf, F. W. & Zintl, R. (eds). Horizontale 
Politikverflechtung. Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen. Frankfurt am Main, New 
York: Campus Verlag, pp. 147-205.
Bichler, M. (1994) 'Le cas du Luxembourg', in Pappas, A. Spyros, Procédures administratives 
nationales de préparation et de mise en oeuvre des décisions communautaires. 
Maastricht: EIPA, pp. 371-386.
Calmes, C. (1991) The Schuman Plan, a plan with complex origins. Luxembourg: Banque et 
Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat.
Centre d'Etudes Libérales (1980) Les Institutions Européennes à Luxembourg; passé, présent 
et perspectives d'avenir. Luxembourg: Imprimerie Nicolay.
Duchêne, F. (1994) Jean Monnet, the first statesman o f interdependence. NY, London: 
Norton & Co.
Eamshaw, D. J. (1984) The European Parliament's quest for a single seat'. Revue 
d'intégration Européenne, vol. 8, pp. 77-93.
Feinberg, J. (1984) Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press.
FIéritier, A. (1991) 'Institutions, Interest and Political Choice', in Czada, R. M. & Héritier, A. 
(eds), Political Choice. Institutions, Rules and the Limits o f Rationality. Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus, pp. 27-52.
Hoscheit, J. -M. & Weyrich, M. (1988) 'Luxembourg: La mise en oeuvre des directives 
communautaires', in Siedentopf, H. & Ziller, J. (eds), Making European Policies Work. 
Volume II, Maastricht: EIPA, pp. 521-569.
Jordan, G. & Richardson, J. J. (1979) Governing under Pressure: the policy process in a post- 
parliamentary democracy. Oxford: Robertson.
Krasner, S. D. (1988) 'Sovereignty: an institutional perspective', Comparative Political 
Studies, voi. 21, pp. 66-94.




























































































Mayntz, R. & Scharpf. F. W. (eds) (1995) Gesellschaftlische Selbstregelung und politische 
Steuerung. Frankfurt/New York: Campus, pp. 39-72.
Merten-Beissel, S. (1987) Administration luxembourgeoise et l'intégration européenne, in 
Debbasch, C. (ed.), Administrations nationales et l'intégration européenne. Actes du 
colloque tenu à Aix en octobre 1986, Paris: Editions du Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique, pp. 43-59.
Minor, J.. 'A further skirmish in the battle of the Parliament's seat'. European Law Review. 
vol. 17, pp. 517-522.
Mokken, R. J. & Stokman, F. N. (1976) 'Power and Influence as Political Phenomena, in 
Barry. B. (ed.). Power and Political Theory. Some European Perspectives. London: 
John Wiley, pp. 33-54.
de Muyser, G. (1969) 'La préparation de la décision communautaire au niveau national 
luxembourgeois', in Gerbet, P. & Pepy, D. (eds.), La décision dans les communautés 
européennes. Bruxelles: Presse Universitaire de Bruxelles, pp. 229-238.
Richardson, J. J. (ed.) (1982) Policy Styles in Western Europe. London: Allen & Unwin.
Russell, B. (1986) The Forms of Power', in Lukes, S. (ed.), Power. New York: New York 
University Press, pp. 19-27.
Skuhra, H. (1983) 'Industrialized small states -  some comparative considerations', in Hôll, O. 
(ed.), Small States in Europe and Dependence. Vienna: Braumüller, pp. 69-82.
Trausch, G. (1978) Joseph Bech, un homme dans son siècle. Luxembourg: Imprimerie Saint 
Paul.
---------(1989) ’Le Luxembourg face au traité de Rome. La stratégie d’un petit pays' in Serra.
E. (ed.), La Relance Européenne et les Traités de Rome. The Relaunching o f Europe 
and the Treaties o f Rome. European Union Liaison Committee of Historians, Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, pp. 423-459.
---------(1992) Histoire du Luxembourg. Paris: Hachette.
---------(1994) 'L'heure européenne qui fait d'une ville de province un carrefour européen' in
Trausch, G. (ed.), La ville de Luxembourg. Du château des comtes à la métropole 
européenne. Anvers: Fonds Mercator, pp. 372-459.
Tsebelis, G. (1990) Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: UCP.
Vogel. H. (1983) 'Small States' Efforts in International Relations: Enlarging the Scope', in 
Hôll, O. (ed.), Small States in Europe and Dependence. Vienna: Braumüller, pp. 54-68.
Wallace, H. (1985) 'Negotiations and Coalition Formation in the European Community', 




























































































---------  (1990) 'Making multilateral negotiations work', in Wallace, W. (ed.). Dynamics of
European integration. London: Pinter, pp. 213-228.
Wemer, P. (1989) 'Le Luxembourg et l'idée européenne', in Gerges. M. (ed.). Memorial. La 




l'Echo de l'Industrie (1952) 'La candidature de Luxembourg au siège du Plan Schuman-, 
l'Echo de l'Industrie. No. 17, 26 April.
The Times (1963) 'Guest from Luxembourg', The Times. 12 November.
Saarbriicker Zeitung (1991) 'Luxemburg will Europas Finanzplatz bleiben', Saarbriicker 
Zeitung. 16 December.
Die Welt (1992) 'Luxemburg hat Anspruch auf die Zentralbank', Die Welt. 23 April.
Financial Times (1992) 'Race for Europe's central bank hots up'. Financial Times. 5 May.
Süddeutsche Zeitung (1992) 'Jahrelanger Streit beendet: StraBburg offiziell Parlamentssitz', 
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 14 December.
Le Monde (1992) 'Les conclusions du conseil européen d'Edimbourg: Le brillant 
rétablissement de M. John Major', Le Monde. 15 December.
Luxemburger Wort (1995) EP-Pràsident Klaus Hansch in Luxemburg: Premier Juncker 
verlangt Garantie fur Mindestzahl europàischer Beamten', Luxemburger Wort. 25 November.
Luxemburger Wort (1996a) 'Frankreich: Die Zahl der EU-Kommissare auf zwolf begrenzen', 
Luxemburger Wort. 10 February.
Luxemburger Wort (1996b) 'Europàischer Standort Luxemburg: Im Joseph-Bech-Gebaude auf 
Kirchberg enstehen rund 800 neue Biiros', Luxemburger Wort. 28 February.
European Documentation
Europe Documents (1992) The Community's Enlargement: The Benelux Memorandum 
submitted to the European Council of Lisbon', Europe Documents. No. 1789, 27 June.
Bull. EC ( 1964a) 'The merger of the executives'. Bulletin o f the EC. No. 11, pp. 43-44.
Bull. EC (1964b) 'Seat of the Community institutions', Bulletin o f the EC. No. 12, pp. 58-59.




























































































Bull. CEE (1965b) 'La fusion des exécutifs'. Bulletin de la CE. No. 4. pp. 11-12.
Bull. EC (1973a) 'The European Monetary Cooperation Fund'. Bulletin o f the EC. No. 4, pp. 
29-30.
Bull. EC (1973b) 'The European Monetary Cooperation Fund'. Bulletin o f the EC. No. 6. pp. 
31-33.
Bull. EC (1980) 'Seat of the European Parliament', Bulletin o f the EC. No. 11. p. 77.
Bull. EC (1981a) 'Maastricht Council'. Bulletin o f the EC. No. 3. p. 9.
Bull. EC (1981b) 'Seat and places of work', Bulletin of the EC. No. 7/8. p. 68.
Bull. EC (1983) 'Seat and places of work of Parliament', Bulletin o f the EC. No. 2. pp. 76-79.
Bull. EC (1992) 'Conclusions of the Presidency. Decision taken by common agreement 
between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the location 
of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies and departments of the European 
Communities', Bulletin o f the EC. No. 12, p. 24.
OJ C152 (1967) Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
on the provisional location of certain institutions and departments of the Community', 
Official Journal o f the European Communities. No C 152. 13 July.
OJ C234 (1981) Resolution on the seat of the institutions and in particular of the European 
Parliament', Official Journal o f the European Communities. No C 234, 14 September, 
pp. 22-25.
OJ C161 (1983) 'Resolution on the consequences to be drawn on the European Parliament's 
adoption, on 7 July 1981, of the Zagari Report', Official Journal o f the European 
Communities. No C 161, 20 June, p. 151.
OJ C47 (1989) 'Resolution on the seat of the institutions and the main place of work of the 
European Parliament', Official Journal o f the European Communities. No C 47, 27 
February, pp. 88-92.
OJ C323 (1993) 'Decision taken by common agreement between the representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, meeting at Head of State and Government level, on 
the location of the seats of certain bodies and departments of the European 
Communities and of Europol', Official Journal o f the European Communities. No C 
323, 30 November, pp. 1-5.
Case 230/81, G. D. o f Luxembourg v. European Parliament, [1983] ECR 255.




























































































Joined Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89, G. D. o f Luxembourg v. European Parliament. [1991] 
ECR 5643.
PE A2.316 (1988) 'Report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the seat 
of the institutions and the main place of work of the European Parliament'. 
Luxembourg: European Parliament.
Luxembourg Government Documents
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1952) 'Luxembourg. Siège provisoire du Plan Schuman . 
Bulletin d'information. No. 12, pp. 124-126.
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1957a) 'Le Grand-Duché et la Communauté Européenne de 
l'Energie Atomique', Bulletin de documentation. No. 11, 24-168.
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1957b) 'Le Grand-Duché et la Communauté Economique 
Européenne1, Extrait du Bulletin de documentation du Service Information et Presse, no. 
12.
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1964) 'La Politique Etrangère du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg: Fusion des Exécutifs', Bulletin de documentation. No. 3, 5 mars. pp. 8-10.
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1992a) 'Le Grand-Duché et la Communauté Economique 
Européenne', 'Discours prononcé par J. Santer, premier ministre et ministre du trésor, 
lors de la séance académique de la Banque Nationale de Belgique à Luxbg. le 25 février 
1992', Bulletin d'information et de documentation. No. 2, pp. 25-28.
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1992b) 'Ansprache von Herm Santer, Regierungsprasident 
und Schatzminister, gelegentlich des 25. Jubilàums der Dresdner Bank Luxembourg 
(SA), am 10. April 1992', Bulletin d'information et de documentation. No. 3, pp. 36-37.
Ministère d’Etat du Luxembourg (1992c) 'Débat parlementaire sur le Traité de Maastricht: 
Réponse de M. Jacques F. Poos, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, faite le 2 juillet 1992 
à la Chambre des Députés', Bulletin d'information et de documentation. No. 5, pp. 18- 
20.
Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg (1993) 'Communiqué du Gouvernement luxembourgeois à 
l'intention de la presse écrite, parlée et télévisée suite au Sommet des Chefs d'Etat et de 
Gouvernement du 29/10/1993 à Bruxelles: "Le siège de Luxembourg consolidé" ', 
Bulletin d'information et de documentation. No. 4, pp. 66-67.
Memoirs
Monnet, J. (1976) Mémoires. Fayard.
Wemer, P. (1991) Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens, Evolutions et Souvenirs, 1945- 





























































































Fayot, B., leader of the Luxembourg Socialist Party, the Letzebuerger Sozialistesch 
































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 




□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1996/97





































































































Working Papers of the Robert Schuman Centre
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1
Fritz W . SC H A R P F
C om m unity and A utonom y M ultilevel
P olicy-M ak in g in the European U nion  *
R S C  N o . 9 4 /2
Paul M cA L E A V E Y
The Political L o g ic  o f  the European
C om m unity  Structural F unds Budget:
L obbying E fforts by D eclin in g  Industrial
R egion s
R S C  N o . 9 4 /3
T osh ih iro  H O R IU C H I 
Japanese P ublic P o licy  for C ooperative  
Supply o f  C redit G uarantee to Sm all F irm s - 
Its E volu tion  S in ce  the P ost W ar and B anks’ 
C om m itm ent
R S C  N o . 9 4 /4
T h om as C H R IS T IA N S E N  
European Integration B etw een  Political 
S cien ce and International R elations Theory: 
T he End o f  S overeign ty  *
R S C  N o . 9 4 /5
Stefaan D E  R Y N C K
The Europeanization o f  R egional
D evelop m en t P o lic ies  in the F lem ish  R egion
R S C  N o . 9 4 /6  
Enrique A L B E R O L A IL A  
C on vergen ce Bands: A  Proposal to  R eform  
the E M S in the Transition to a C om m on  
Currency
R S C  N o . 9 4 /7
R osa lyn  H IG G IN S
T he EC and the N ew  U nited  N ations
R S C  N o . 9 4 /8  
Sidney T A R R O W
Social M ovem ents in Europe: M ovem ent 
S ociety  or Europeanization o f  C onflict?
R S C  N o . 9 4 /9
V ojin  D IM IT R U EV IC
The 1974  C onstitution as a Factor in the
C o llap se o f  Y u goslav ia  or a s a S ign  o f
D ecayin g  Totalitarianism
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 0  
Susan S T R A N G E
European B u sin ess in Japan: A  P o licy  
C rossroads?
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 1  
M ilica U V A L IC
Privatization in D isintegrating East European 
States: T he C ase o f  Form er Y ugoslavia
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 2  
A lberto CH ILO SI
Property and M anagem ent Privatization in 
Eastern European Transition: E conom ic  
C onsequences o f  Alternative Privatization  
P rocesses
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 3
Richard SIN N O T T
Integration T heory, Subsid iarity and the 
Internationalisation o f  Issues: The  
Im plications for L egitim acy *
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 4
Sim on JO H N S O N /H eid i K R O LL  
C om plem entarities. M anagers and M ass  
Privatization Program s after C om m unism
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 5  
Renzo D A V ID D I
Privatization in the Transition to a Market 
E conom y
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 6
A lberto B A C C IN I
Industrial O rganization and the F inancing o f  
Sm all Firms: T he C ase o f  M agneT ek
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 7
Jonathan G O L U B
T h e P ivota l R o le  o f  B ritish  S o v ere ig n ty  in 
EC Environm ental P o licy
R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 8
Peter V ig g o  JA K O B SE N  
M ultilateralism  M atters but H ow ?
The Im pact o f  M ultilateralism  on Great 
P ow er P o licy  T ow ards the Break-up o f  
Y ugoslavia



























































































R S C  N o . 9 4 /1 9
Andrea BOSCO
A ‘Federator’ for Europe: Altiero Spinelli 
and the Constituent Role of the European 
Parliament
R S C  N o . 9 4 /2 0
Johnny LAURSEN
Blueprints of Nordic Integration. Dynamics 
and Institutions in Nordic Cooperation, 
1945-72
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and 
the Evolution of Rules for a Single 
European Market
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2  
Ute COLLIER
Electricity Privatisation and Environmental 
Policy in the UK: Some Lessons for the 
Rest of Europe
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3  
Giuliana GEMELLI 
American Influence on European 
Management Education: The Role of the 
Ford Foundation
R S C  N o . 9 5 /4  
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Institutional Reform in the European 
Community: Are there Alternatives to the 
Majoritarian Avenue? *
R S C  N o . 9 5 /5
Vivien A. SCHMIDT
The New World Order, Incorporated:
The Rise of Business and the Decline of the 
Nation-State
R S C  N o . 9 5 /6  
Lies bet HOOGHE
Subnational Mobilisation in the European 
Union
R S C  N o . 9 5 /7
Gary MARKS/Liesbel HOOGHE/Kermit 
BLANK
European Integration and the Stale
R S C  N o . 9 5 /8
Sonia LUCARELLI
The International Community and the
Yugoslav Crisis: A Chronology of Events *
R S C  N o . 9 5 /9
A Constitution for the European Union? 
Proceedings o f a Conference, 12-13 May 
1994, Organized by the Robert Schuman 
Centre with the Patronage o f the European 
ParUament
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 0
Martin RHODES
'Subversive Liberalism’: Market Integration, 
Globalisation and the European Welfare 
State
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 1
Joseph H.H. WEILER/ Ulrich HALTERN/ 
Franz MAYER
European Democracy and its Critique - 
Five Uneasy Pieces
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 2
Richard ROSE/Christian HAERPFER 
Democracy and Enlarging the European 
Union Eastward
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 3  
Donatella DELLA PORTA 
Social Movements and the State: Thoughts 
on the Policing of Protest
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 4
Patrick A. MC CARTHY/Aris 
ALEXOPOULOS
Theory Synthesis in IR - Problems & 
Possibilities
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 5
Denise R. OSBORN 
Crime and the UK Economy
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 6  
Jérôme HENRY/Jens WEIDMANN 
The French-German Interest Rate 
Differential since German Unification:
The Impact of the 1992-1993 EMS Crises
R S C  N o . 9 5 / 1 7 ______
Giorgia GIOVANNETTI/Ramon 
MARIMON
A Monetary Union for a Heterogeneous 
Europe
R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 8
Bernhard WINKLER
Towards a Strategic View on EMU -
A Critical Survey



























































































R S C  N o . 9 5 /1 9  
Joseph  H .H . W E IL E R  
The Slate “über ailes”
D em o s, T e los and the G erm an M aastricht 
D ecision
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 0  
Marc E. S M Y R L
From R egional P o licy  C om m unities to 
European N etw orks: Inter-regional 
D ivergen ce in the Im plem entation o f  EC  
R egional P o licy  in France
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 1
C laus-D ieter E H L E R M A N N  
Increased D ifferentiation  or Stronger 
U niform ity  *
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 2
E m ile N O ËL
La conférence intergouvem em entale de 19%  
V ers un n ou vel ordre institutionnel
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 3  
Jo SH A W
European U n ion  L egal S tu d ies in C risis?  
T ow ards a N ew  D yn am ic
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 4  
H ervé B R IB O SIA
The European Court and N ational Courts - 
D octrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change  
in its S ocia l C ontext  
Report on Belgium
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 5  
Juliane K O K O TT
The European Court and N ational Courts - 
D octrine and Jurisprudence: L egal C hange  
in its S ocia l C ontext  
Report on Germany
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 6  ______
M onica C L A E S/B runo D E  W ITTE  
The European Court and N ational C ourts - 
D octrine and Jurisprudence: L egal C hange  
in its S oc ia l C ontext 
Report on the Netherlands
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 7  
Karen A LT ER
T he European Court and N ational C ourts - 
D octrine and Jurisprudence: L egal C hange  
in its S ocia l C ontext
Explaining National Court Acceptance of  
European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation o f  Theories o f  Legal Integration
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 8  
Jens PLO TN E R
The European Court and N ational Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: L egal Change  
in its S ocia l C ontext  
Report on France
R S C  N o . 9 5 /2 9  
P.P. C R A IG
The European Court and N ational Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: L egal Change  
in its S ocia l C ontext  
Report on the United Kingdom
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 0
F rancesco P. R U G G E R I L A D E R C H I  
The European Court and N ational C ourts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: L egal Change  
in its Socia l C ontext 
Report on Italy
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 1
Henri E T IE N N E
The European Court and N ational C ourts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change  
in its Socia l C ontext 
Report on Luxembourg
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 2
Philippe A . W E B E R -P A N A R IE L L O
T he Integration o f  M atters o f  Justice and
H om e A ffairs into T itle VI o f  the Treaty on
European U nion: A  Step T ow ards m ore
Dem ocracy?
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 3  
Debra MATTER
Data, Inform ation, E vid en ce and R hetoric in 
the Environm ental P o licy  Process:
T he C ase o f  S o lid  W aste M anagem ent
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 4  
M ichael J. A R T IS
Currency Substitution in  European F inancial 
Markets
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 5
Christopher T A Y L O R
Exchange Rate Arrangem ents for a M ulti-
Speed Europe
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 6  
Iver B. N E U M A N N  
C ollective Identity Formation: S e lf  and 




























































































R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 7  
Sonia LU C A R EL LI
The European R esp onse to the Y u goslav  
Crisis: Story o f  a T w o -L ev e l Constraint
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 8  
A lec ST O N E  SW EE T  
Constitutional D ia logu es in the European  
C om m unity *
R S C  N o . 9 5 /3 9
T h om as G E H R IN G  
Integrating Integration Theory: 
N eofunctionalism  and International R egim es
R S C  N o . 9 5 /4 0
David C O B H A M
T he U K ’s  Search for a M onetary P olicy:
In and Out o f  the ERM
*  *  *
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1  
U te CO LLIER
Im plem enting a C lim ate C hange Strategy in 
the European Union: O bstacles and 
Opportunities
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2  
Jonathan G O L U B  
S overeignty  and Subsidiarity in E U  
Environm ental P olicy
R S C  N o . 9 6 /3  
Jonathan G O L U B
State P ow er and Institutional Influence in 
European Integration: L esson s from the 
Packaging W aste D irective
R S C  N o . 9 6 /4
Renaud D E H O U S S S E
Intégration  ou  d ésin tégration ?  C in q  th èses
sur l'in c id e n c e  de l ’in tégration  europ éen n e
sur les structures étatiques
R S C  N o . 9 6 /5
Jens R A S M U S S E N  
Integrating S cientific  Expertise into  
Regulatory D ecision-M aking.
Risk Management Issues - Doing Things 
Safely with Words: Rules and Laws
R S C  N o . 9 6 /6
Olivier G O D A R D
Integrating S cientific  Expertise into
R egulatory D ecision-M aking.
Social Decision-Making under Conditions of  
Scientific Controversy, Expertise and the 
Precautionary Principle
R S C  N o . 9 6 /7  
Robert H A N K IN
Integrating S cientific  Expertise into 
Regulatory D ecision-M aking.
The Cases o f  Food and Pharmaceuticals
R S C  N o . 9 6 /8  
Ernesto PR EV ID I 
Integrating S cientific  Expertise into 
Regulatory D ecision -M ak in g.
L'organisation des responsabilités publiques 
et privées dans la régulation européenne des 
risques: un vide institutionnel entre les 
deux?
R S C  N o . 9 6 /9  
Jo se f F A L K E
Integrating S cientific  Expertise into 
R egulatory D ecision-M aking.
The Role o f  Non-governmental 
Standardization Organizations in the 
Regulation o f Risks to Health and the 
Environment
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 0
Christian JO ERG ES  
Integrating S cientific  Expertise into  
Regulatory D ecision-M aking.
Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and 
the European Court o f  Justice: Legal 
Frameworks for Denationalized Governance 
Structures
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 1  
Martin SH A PIR O  
Integrating Scientific  Expertise into 
Regulatory D ecision -M ak in g .
The Frontiers o f  Science Doctrine: American 
Experiences with the Judicial Control o f  
Science-Based Decision-Making
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 2
G ianna BO E R O /G iuseppe T U L LIO  
Currency Substitution and the Stability o f  
the G erm an D em and for M on ey  Function  
B efore and A fter the Fall o f  the Berlin W all



























































































R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 3
Riccardo M A R S E L U /M arco  V A N N IN I  
Estim ating the E conom ic M odel o f  C rim e in 
the P resence o f  O rganised Crim e: E vidence  
from Italy
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 4  
Paul D E  G R A U W E
The E con om ics o f  C on vergen ce Tow ards 
M onetary U nion  in Europe
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 5
D aniel G R O S
A  R econsideration  o f  the C ost o f  EM U  
T he Im portance o f  External S h ocks and 
Labour M obility
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 6
Pierre LA SC O U M E S/Jérôm e V A L L U Y  
L es activ ités publiques con ventionnelles  
(A PC ): un nou vel instrum ent de politique  
publique? L ’exem p le  de la protection de 
l’environnem ent industriel
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 7  
Sharm ila R EG E
Caste and G en d er  T he V io len ce  A gainst 
W om en in India
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 8
L ou is C H A R P E N T IE R
L ’arrêt “K alanke” , exp ression  du d iscours
dualiste de l’égalité
R S C  N o . 9 6 /1 9
Jean BL O N D EL /R ichard SIN N O T T /P alle  
S V E N S S O N
Institutions and Attitudes: Tow ards an 
U nderstanding o f  the Problem  o f  L ow  
Turnout in the European Parliament 
E lection s o f  1994
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 0
K eith BL A C K B U R N /L U 1 H A N S E N  
P ublic P o licy  and E con om ic  G rowth in  an 
Im perfectly C om petitive W orld o f  
Interdependent E conom ies
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 1
John A R R O W SM IT H
P itfa lls on  the Path to a S in g le  European
Currency
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 2
R o el M .W J . B E E T S M A /A . Lans
B O V E N B E R G
D o es M onetary U nification  Lead to  
E xcessive  D ebt Accum ulation?
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 3  
Margaret LEVI 
A  State o f  Trust
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 4  
Lorenzo B IN I SM A G H I  
H ow  Can the E C B  be C redible?
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 5  
O livier FILLIEULE
P olice  R ecords and the N ational Press in 
France. Issu es in  the M eth od o logy  o f  Data- 
C ollection  from  N ew spapers
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 6  
P eter H. S C H U C K
T he Re-evaluation o f  Am erican C itizenship
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 7  
Peter R O B IN S O N
T he R ole and L im its o f  A ctive Labour 
Market P olicy
R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 8  
Sasha BAILL IE
T he Seat o f  the European Institutions: An  
Exam ple o f  Sm all State Influence in 
European D ecision-m aking
•out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
